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RECENT CASES
ANTITRUST LAW-REATIoNsmP BETWEEN PURCHASERS EN-
TITLING THEM TO COMPARABLE TREATMENT HELD NECESSARY To
FINDING OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER SECTION 2(a) oF CLAY-
TON ACT
Petitioner, a "national" brewer then selling its product at different
prices in different marketing areas throughout the country, lowered its
prices to retailers in the St. Louis area alone, almost to the level of those
charged by its local and regional competitors.1 For this price cut petitioner
was charged with violating section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by
the Robinson-Patman Act.2 The Federal Trade Commission found that
petitioner had discriminated in price as between purchasers differently
located, that those discriminations resulted in a proscribed injury to com-
petition between petitioner and its competitors in the St. Louis market
and, consequently, that petitioner had violated the act.3 The Seventh
Circuit reversed, holding that since there was no relationship between peti-
tioner's purchasers that entitled them to comparable price treatment, there
was no discrimination in price within the meaning of section 2(a); had
those of petitioner's purchasers who were offered different pricing sched-
ules been in competition with one another, the requisite relationship would
have been established. 4 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 677 (7th
Cir. 1959), petition for cert. filed, 28 U.S.L. WEEK 3074 (U.S. Sept. 9,
1959) (No. 389).
1 In the great majority of markets, petitioner sells its product at a "premium"
price which is higher than the price of beers having merely local or regional distribu-
tion. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 1959), petition for
cert. filed, 28 U.S.L. Week 3074 (U.S. Sept. 9, 1959) (No. 389).
2 Hereinafter referred to as § 2(a).
3 Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 1958 TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, F.T.C. Com-
plaints, Orders, & Stipulations 1957-1958) 1126,705 (FTC 1957).
4 The court's opinion is in some regards puzzling. Perhaps confusing the two
issues-discrimination and injury, both of which must be proved under the statute-
the court seems to focus at times on a stated issue of discrimination among petitioner's
competitors. The court states that petitioner did not discriminate against its local
competitors, that it was significant that the Commission was not seeking to protect
petitioner's "competitors" in other areas, and that in fact the challenged price cuts
were discriminatory only as against these latter non-local, as opposed to local, "com-
petitors." 265 F.2d at 681. Again, the court speaks of the need for finding a
relationship between petitioner's local competitors "and either its competitors or
its customers in other areas." Id. at 682. Unless "purchasers" be read for "competitors"
or the concept of injury be interjected into the term "discriminate," it is difficult to
ascertain the court's meaning, in view of the fact that the statute is concerned with




"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit
of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them." 5
Prior cases under the section have not been directly concerned with the
definition of discrimination insofar as it depends upon the relationship
among purchasers at different prices. Consequently there has obtained
some unclarity in this respect. The Ninth Circuit in a vague opinion has
indicated that to constitute discrimination a price differentiation must be
made among competing purchasers.0 A number of other cases have used
similar language, although the definition of discrimination in 2(a) was not
there in issue.7 On the other hand, the one case which appears to have
made a thorough examination of the question rejected, also in dictum,
precisely such a contention.8 And some courts have spoken of discrimina-
tion merely in terms of a difference in price as among purchasers of similar
goods.9 In a number of cases involving fact situations where the compe-
tition allegedly injured was not the so-called "secondary line" competition
-that among purchasers--courts have found discrimination under sec-
S49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
6 Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farm Co., 231 F.2d 356, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1955)
(alternative holding), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
7 See Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 70 n.10 (1953)
(dictum), where the Court quotes favorably the Utterback definition (see note 19
infra) and speaks of discrimination in terms of a price difference among competitors.
See also Naifeh v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc., 218 F.2d 202, 205, 206 (10th Cir.
1954) (dictum); Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1, 7 (7th
Cir. 1949) (dictum), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950); General Shale Prod. Corp.
v. Struck Constr. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-03 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (very strong dictum
supporting the reasoning of the instant case), aff'd, 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942)
(no mention of the "discrimination" issue), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943). Section
2(e) of the act, prohibiting discrimination "in favor of one purchaser against an-
other" in furnishing services or facilities, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e)
(1958), has been "uniformly . . . construed" to refer to competing purchasers.
AusTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE RoBINSoN-
PAT A AcT 22 (rev. ed. 1953). However, Austin also says that this is not con-
trolling upon interpretation of the term "discrimination" in 2(a) because the use of
the term in 2(e) has a different meaning derived from its different context.
8 Purex Corp., 51 F.T.C. 100, 105-08 (1954). A similar contention was appar-
ently rejected in Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 28 U.S.L.
WEEK 1033, 2107 (10th Cir. Aug. 17, 1959).
9 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 721 (1948); FTC v. A. E. Staley
Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 757 (1945) (involved competing purchasers) ; Moog Indus.
v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 49 (8th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 411 (1958) (per curiam)
(involved competing purchasers); E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 518
(6th Cir. 1944) (a case involving injury to primary line competition where the court
says that although the record shows discrimination among competing customers, the
statute requires only that the discrimination be among different purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality).
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tion 2(a) without considering whether or not the purchasers were in
competition with each other. These cases have dealt with geographical
price reductions,'0 functional discounts," basing point pricing systems,
12
and buyers in segregated markets; '3 possibly they involve the undecided
assumption that discrimination consists in the mere existence of a price
differential.' 4 Many commentators have likewise assumed or asserted
that differential pricing is ipso facto equivalent to discrimination without
discussing the need for any particular relationship among purchasers.
15
10 Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954) ; Maryland Baking Co.
v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957) (per curiam); Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC,
148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945) (per curiam), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945), motion
to modify denied, some language clarified, 155 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1946) (per curiam).
There have been a number of FTC decisions regarding the same marketing practices.
See, e.g., Page Dairy Co., 50 F.T.C. 395 (1953).
11 The practice gives rise to problems of so-called "third line" competition, where
there is alleged an injury to competition among the retailer customers of a wholesaler
buying from the seller and other retailers who buy direct from seller. See FTC v.
Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 55 (1948); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210
(7th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951), reissued wuith nsew
findings, 49 F.T.C. 923 (1953), set aside, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S.
396 (1958). It seems clear that the immediate purchasers, standing in different
functional positions, are not in competition with each other. See AUSTIN, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 19; Gordon, Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act-The Mean-
ing of Sections 1 and 3, 22 A.B.A.J. 593, 596 (1936). But cf. PATMAx, THE ROBIN-
SON-PATMAN ACT 54 (1938).
12 See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 721 (1948). Basing point pricing
involves the inclusion in the customer's price of freight charges determined by rail
schedules from one or several arbitrarily selected base points, whether or not the
goods are actually shipped from those points. While it may result in injury to com-
peting purchasers, it is quite possible that the purchasers in the different parts of the
country are noncompeting, and that the only injury is to primary line competition.
13 See Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953). The complaint under
2(a) charged that respondent offered different prices to those in the two markets
for spark plugs (those buying for resale for replacement, and those buying for
original equipment), and that this practice tended to lessen competition as between
other sellers and respondent. The two purchasers' markets are noncompeting. Al-
though it was argued that such price differentials were not within the scope of 2(a)
(see Note, Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman Act: The Standard
Oil Litigation, 67 HARv. L. Rav. 294, 302 (1953)), the Hearing Examiner recom-
mended a cease-and-desist order. The Commission, without discussing the issue, went
on to consider the question of the effect of the differentials, but failed to find the
requisite injury to competition.
14Thus, the commentators tend to define discrimination in terms of price differ-
ential and to state that the requisite competitive injury can be shown by proving
injury to the seller's competitors, placing little importance on the presence or
absence of competition among purchasers. See Haslett, Price Discriminations and
Their Justifications Under the Robinson-Patinan Act of 1936, 46 MIcH. L. Rav. 450,
454 (1948). Other authors more explicitly assert the irrelevance of the competing
purchaser factor. AUsTIN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 18, 19, 21; Crowley, Equal Price
Treatment Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 95 U. PA. L. Rxv. 306, 325-26 (1947).
And see A Symposium on the Robinson-Patinan Act, 49 Nw. U.L. REV. 196, 210
(1954): "sale of goods to non-competing purchasers at different prices, however, may
subject the seller to litigation"; id. at 202: "sale at discriminatory prices to non-
competing buyers may harm competition with the seller and thus be a violation of
the act." It appears that the commentators have drawn their conclusions or their
assumptions from the assumptions of the cases, and subsequent cases may have in
turn been influenced by the commentators.
15 See authorities cited note 14 supra. See also ATr'y GEN. NAT'L COMM.
ANTITRUST REP. 156 (1955) (giving no particular attention to the issue, it speaks of
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However, in the instant case, the court held that a relationship must exist,
and indicated that inter-purchaser competition would satisfy this require-
ment. The decision appears to leave open the question: what, if anything,
other than competition will satisfy the requirement of "some relationship
between the different purchasers which entitles them to comparable treat-
ment"? 16 One possible answer may lie in a portion of legislative history
relied on by the court: a statement by Representative Utterback, a floor
manager of the conference bill which later became section 2(a).17 After
asserting, as the instant court emphasizes, that a competitive relationship
among purchasers will satisfy the requirements of section 2(a), the state-
ment continues:
"Where, also, the price to one [purchaser] is so low as to involve
a sacrifice of some part of the seller's necessary costs and profit as
applied to that business, it leaves that deficit inevitably to be made
up in higher prices to his other customers; and there, too, a relation-
ship may exist on which to base the charge of discrimination." 18
Thus, inasmuch as this type of "relationship" should not be difficult to
find for a trier of fact so inclined 19-every price cut involving "a sac-
rifice of some part of the seller's necessary costs and profit as applied to that
business"--attempts by this or similar reasoning to supply the requisite
relationship in fact situations involving non-competing purchasers may
prove a fertile field for development by those courts which do not wish
to directly repudiate the instant case, but are dissatisfied with its result.
20
price discrimination as equivalent to price difference) ; McAllister, Price Control by
Law in the United States, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 273, 291 (1937); 1 TRADE REG.
REP. 3505, at 5031.
10 Instant case at 681.
17 Representative Utterback's major premise is in accord with the holding of the
instant case. "[A] discrimination is more than a mere difference. Underlying the
meaning of the word is the idea that some relationship exists between the parties to
the discrimination which entitles them to equal treatment, whereby the difference
granted to one casts some burden or disadvantage upon the other." 80 CoNG. REc.
9416 (1936). This assertion has been mentioned with favor by the courts: See
Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 70 n.10. But see Purex
Corp., 51 F.T.C. 100, 106; AusTIn, op. cit. supra note 7, at 18 n.30.
18o80 CONG. REc.'9416 (1936).
19 The latitude which this language, as probative of "congressional intent," would
permit a court sympathetic to the FTC is obvious. We of course do not suggest that
the broadest possible reading of Representative Utterback's statement-a reading
which would label virtually every differential lowering of prices a discrimination-
fairly represents its maker's intendment. In fact the theory that a seller must make
up lower prices by raising prices in the other non-competitive markets, expressed by
a number of Congressmen has been attacked as fallacious-as a mere "illiterate notion."
See Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1289,
1331 (1948) ; Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look
at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 937 (1951). Nevertheless, the potential value
to the FTC advocate of the Utterback utterance-even constrained within some more
narrow compass of its logic-is not insignificant.
20.A possible variant attempt to satisfy the relationship requirement, inverting
Representative Utterbacls conception, may lie in argument that the higher prices
charged in other areas create sufficient surplus assets to enable a price cutter to
maintain price reduction in the area in question.
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On the other hand, if the implication to be drawn from the decision
is that section 2(a) is applicable only where a price differential involves
competing purchasers, then the ruling may establish an interpretation of
2(a) very different than that which has generally been attributed to
the amendments: that which accords them the effect of extending to the
FTC jurisdiction over cases involving competitive injury caused by non-
uniform pricing practices.2 1 The language of the act, prohibiting dis-
crimination, the effect of which is "substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers
of either of them," 2 seems to be drawn with a breadth calculated to
enable the FTC to reach all competitive injury resulting from differ-
ential pricing. Yet by shifting the emphasis of the statute from injury
to competition to concern with the relationship among purchasers-
by demanding that purchasers differently treated be competitive as pre-
requisite to attaching to an instance of non-uniform pricing the label "dis-
crimination" which is itself the necessary precondition of FTC considera-
tion of the question of injury-the rule of the instant case would seem to
preclude from FTC jurisdiction a large class of cases potentially involving
those very kinds of harm to competition which the act was designed to
prevent and which it describes in specific terms.2 3  Suppose a case of a
differential pricing practice intended to injure and in fact injuring a pri-
mary line competitor-thus destroying "competition with . . . [the]
. . . person who . . . grants . . . the benefit of such discrimina-
tion." 24 Should the application of the act to frustrate such a practice
turn on whether or not the purchasers at different prices are competitive
among themselves? In either instance the injury to seller's competitors
is identical and indisputably within the scope of evil aimed at by the sec-
tion. To afford FTC competence in the one case and to withhold it in
the other is to make the enforcement of 2 (a) and the prevention of injuries
expressly within its purview depend upon the fortuitous concurrence with
those injuries of circumstances entirely extraneous to them.
In support of its holding, however, the court expressed concern over
what it regarded as an attempt by the FTC to enlarge the scope of 2(a)
21 See Crovley, supra note 14, at 325-26; Haslett, supra note 14, at 454-57.
2249 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958). (Emphasis added.) See
text accompanying note 5 mipra.
23Cases of this type may involve functional discounts, basing point pricing sys-
tems, and buyers in segregated markets. See notes 10-14 .supra and accompanying
text. Functional discounts, see ATr'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 49-50;
67 HARV. L. REv. 295, 295 (1953), and basing point pricing systems, see Corn Prod.
Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 736-37 (1945), have in general been treated as any
other price differential: valid only if there is not the proscribed effect on competition.
In assailing these as antitrust violations, there has been no mention of a need for the
purchasers under the practices to be in competition with each other.
2449 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958) (quoted in text accompanying
note 5 supra).
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in order to obtain jurisdiction over predatory pricing practices and geo-
graphical price discriminations. 2 As to these latter offenses, the court
indicated, a remedy must be sought under section 3 of the Robinson-
Patman Act where Congress had intended to "meet head-on" 26 the problem
of a seller's lowering prices in a single market, prohibiting under penal
sanction both inter-market price-cutting and selling "at unreasonably low
prices" where the seller's purpose is "destroying competition or eliminating
a competitor." 27 Yet both legislative history and the rationales of the
respective sections argue convincingly against the proposition that the
existence of section 3, although admittedly specifically applicable to the
kind of pricing here involved, was intended to exclude the concurrent but
more general application of 2(a). Originally introduced as an alternative
to the Robinson-Patman Bill 28 and later incorporated into the enactment
along with those provisions amending section 2 of the Clayton Act, sec-
tion 3 appears never to have been conceived as providing a coverage of
activities-such as geographical price discrimination-deemed uncovered
by the differently administered section 2(a). To the contrary, its co-
author and others seem to have viewed it as having the purposes, first, of
enabling a person injured by actions within its scope to obtain a quicker
relief through the local United States attorneys than was available by pur-
suit of the unfamiliar processes of the FTC and, second, of providing by
criminal sanctions a more vigorous deterrent than the cognate provisions
of the Clayton amendments.29  Thus envisaged, section 3 merely supple-
ments section 2(a), applying harsher and more categorical restrictions to
a specific and limited class of evils felt to demand particular treatment:
intent to injure competition, rather than effect of injuring competition, is
the target of its penal process.3 0 But this very difference of its focus,
importing as it does both a greater difficulty of proof in establishing a
violation and a lesser sensitivity of response in protecting against injurious
pricing practices, points to the desirability of maintaining a coordinate
applicability of section 2(a). Only the latter is within the enforcement
2-Instant case at 682.
26 Ibid.
2 7 After prohibiting discrimination against competitors of the purchaser in certain
specified situations, the statute provides that it is unlawful to "sell . . .goods in
any part of the United States at prices lower than those exacted by said person
elsewhere in the United States for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminat-
ing a competitor . . . ; or, to sell . . . goods at unreasonably low prices for the
purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor." Robinson-Patman
Act §3, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1952).
28ZOR & FELDmAN, BusINEss UNDER THE NEW PRIcE LAWS 53-54 (1937);
Rowe, Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act, 57 COLUm. L. REv. 1059, 1070-72
(1957).
29 80 CONG. REc. 6348-49 (1936) (remarks of Senators King, Borah, and Robin-
son). This also appears to be the view taken by the House Conference report. See
H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936). But see PATMAN, op. Cit. supra
note 11, at 49, 50.
so Compare note 5 supra and accompanying text with note 27 supra.
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powers of the FTC.31 And it is to the FTC that the principal duty of
preserving sound marketing conditions should be left, both because Con-
gress has specifically assigned that function to it and because, as the Justice
Department itself apparently recognizes, the procedures of the Com-
mission are "better suited to the primary enforcement of price discrimina-
tion bans." 32 In fact, the Justice Department has "largely foresaken the
law" and has been reluctant to enforce section 3.83 Moreover, it is a
consideration not to be ignored, in appraising the relative merits of the
two sections as instruments for the correction of the kind of competitive
obstruction here involved, that serious constitutional question has been
expressed concerning section 3, grounded on doubt as to whether its pro-
scriptions provide a sufficiently definite standard of criminal conduct.
3 4
Two other antitrust statutes might conceivably be utilized to curb
the kind of activity which the instant ruling puts beyond the reach of
2(a). But these are partial and ineffective controls at best. Section 2 of
the Sherman Act could be applied by the Justice Department to halt geo-
graphic price cutting by a single seller, but only upon proof that the pricing
practice was in pursuit of an attempt to monopolize.35 Or the FTC might
take action under section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act
prohibiting "unfair methods of competition." 36 It has been suggested
that this latter section clearly embraces discriminatory pricing arrange-
ments,3z and in fact it seems to be sufficiently broad to be used for the
purpose.38  But although its invocation would offer at least the advantage
of comporting FTC jurisdiction, section 5(a) is not the trenchant anti-
31 See 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
32 AT'y GEN. NAT'L CoMm. ANTITRUST REP. 376.
33 Id. at 199. Until 1955, the Justice Department had brought only three suits
under § 3 and had obtained no convictions. However, in a development that may
presage a growing concern with that section, the Department has obtained two con-
victions in three § 3 suits since that date, both involving geographical price reductions.
See Letter From the Justice Department to the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, Sept. 3, 1959, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
34 Objections center principally upon the third clause. See ATn'Y GEN. NAT'L
Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 201, characterizing the doubts as to the constitutionality of
the section as seemingly "well-founded." And see Symposium on the Robinson-Patman
Act-The Meaning and Judicial Development of Section Three of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 196, 285, 292-94 (1954) (recommending the repeal of
section 3).
35 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958). The statute prohibits
monopolizing, or attempting to monopolize, any part of interstate trade or commerce.
Its application to price differentials is obviously severely limited.
36 66 Stat. 632 (1952), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45(a) (1958).
37 Rowe, Discriminatory Sales of Commodities in Commerce, 67 YALE L.J. 1155,
1156 (1958).
38 See Comment, The "New" Federal Trade Commission and the Enforcement
of the Antitrust Laws, 65 YALE L.J. 34, 39 (1955). And see FTC v. Motion Picture
Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953). Cf. Rowe, supra note 37, at
1162-63: "the FTC has increasingly resorted to the general prohibitions on 'unfair
methods of competition' in that section to pursue pricing practices of the type con-
templated by the Robinson-Patman Act but somehow exempt from its terms."
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price-cut weapon that 2 (a) is; "theoretical exposure to the Federal Trade
Commission Act is far removed from the virtually automatic illegality
threatening price differentials under the Robinson-Patman Act." 39 More-
over, one may doubt whether 5 (a) can be made to cover the full range
of pricing practices that the instant case removes from the scope of Clayton
Act controls. 40 But, in any event, the effect of the current ruling will be
to remove from the hands of the government (save insofar as the Sherman
Act may be successfully invoked) one extremely important device for the
enforcement of antitrust policy in the differential pricing situation: the
treble damage suit afforded any person injured by activity in contravention
of the antitrust laws. 41 This device has been hailed as giving private per-
sons a motive for enforcement of the antitrust laws and thus relieving gov-
ernmental agencies from part of their enforcement burden,42 as supplying
an ancillary force of private investigators, 43 and as providing a greater
deterrent than that resulting from the possibility of governmental action.
44
While the Clayton Act is an antitrust law for treble damage purposes,45
39 Id. at 1163. But cf. 65 YALE L.J. 34, 38: "The FTC could lubricate the chan-
nels of enforcement if it phrased Clayton Act orders under both the Clayton Act and
the FTC Act. Orders issued under Section 5 of the FTC Act are immediately opera-
tive in their own right."
4oFor example, in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949),
revld, 340 U.S. 231 (1951), reissued with new findings, 49 FTC 923 (1953), set aside,
233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), af'd, 355 U.S. 396 (1958), how could Standard Oil
have been charged with an unfair method of competition when there was no injury
to primary or to secondary line competition? Against whom could they be deemed
to have employed an unfair method of competition? It is conceivable, of course, that
a method might be adjudged "unfair" whenever its foreseeable effect is injurious to
competition at any level. But such a construction of the statute would seem unreason-
ably, as well as dangerously, broad.
4138 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). Although the statute clearly
gives the right to any person injured, a few cases have used language to the effect
that only a purchaser may sue for treble damages. See, e.g., Klein v. Lionel Corp.,
237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956). However, the majority of opinion appears to be to the
contrary. See, e.g., 6 TOULMIN, ANTI-TRusT LAws, § 16.1 (1951).
42 See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947).
See also House Select Comm. on Small Business, Price Discrimination, the Robinson-
Patman Act, and the Attorney General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust
Laws, H.R_ REP. No. 2966, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 210 (1956), calling the private damage
suit "the mainspring of the enforcement mechanism of the Robinson-Patman Act."
But see Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private
Antitrust Suits, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 363 (1954), taking the position that the treble
damage suit has failed as a means of inviting private enforcement because the antici-
pated size of the suit discourages pioneering by private plaintiffs, who prefer to wait
until the government has sued and won its case.
The preferred practice is inspired by legislative provision that once the United
States government has obtained a final judgment or decree under the antitrust laws
to the effect that a defendant has violated those laws, such judgment or decree is
prima facie evidence against that defendant in any action brought by any party under
the antitrust laws. 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958).
43 Weinberg v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 48 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
44 Loevinger, Private Action--The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTrrRUST
BuLL. 167, 168 (1958).
45 The "antitrust laws" are defined in the Clayton Act. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
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private suits for treble damages are not maintainable under either sec-
tion 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act 4 6 or section 5(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
47
Such a weakening of the antitrust controls upon differential pricing
practices as is realized by the instant decision appears plainly contrary to
congressional intent. The legislative history indicates that fact situations
involving geographically discriminatory price cutting were conceived as
falling within the scope of section 2(a). One major purpose of the Clayton
Act was to end the regional pricing practices by which powerful nation-
wide sellers, reducing their prices in selected localities, could drive their
smaller competitors out of business. 48 The Robinson-Patman amendments,
introduced as a measure to strengthen the Clayton Act,49 speak with
respect to discriminations in language very similar to that of the Clayton
Act itself.50 Nowhere is there any indication of an intent to undercut the
force of the original statute by confining the scope of the amendment to
cases involving competing purchasers. 51
4 6 Although there was some controversy over this point, it was resolved by
Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Milk Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
4738 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
4 8 Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774, 778-79 (2d Cir. 1923) ; H.R. REP. No. 627,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1913).
49 H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 8 (1936) ; 80 CONG. REc. 3115-16
(remarks of Senators Gore and Logan), 7759 (remarks of Representative Patman,
question 6) (1936).
50 The Clayton Act provided: "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodi-
ties. . . ." Ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). As an example of the application of
the Clayton Act to a fact situation somewhat similar to that of the instant case, see
Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929),
cert. decnied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929).
51 The view that price differentials as among non-competing purchasers are within
the scope of 2(a) was adopted in Purex Corp., 51 FTC 100, 105-06 (1954). See
also Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 120 (1954). There does exist some
legislative history tending to support the contrary position taken by the instant court:
see the interchange on the House floor between Representatives Boileau and Miller,
80 CONG. REc. 8229-30 (1936). And see the opinion of Representative Patman,
indicative of the intent of the authors of the act, in PATMAN, op. cit. .supra note 10,
at 49-50; see also id. at 5, 53, 58 question 61. But see id. at 24 question 16 ("dis-
criminate" is synonymous with price differential), 58 question 60, 59 question 64; 80
CONG. REc. 6332 (1936) (remarks of Senator Logan). One hypothesis which may
serve to reconcile both sides of the legislative history is that Congress, principally
concerned as it was with the problem of large scale buyers obtaining discriminations
in their favor, and speaking with a view to that specific problem, talked of the need
for competition without considering the inroads which a literal interpretation of
their words might make on 2(a). In this regard, note that the House report, while
favoring an express provision allowing functional discounts because such discounts
"do not give rise to the competitive evils at which the bill is aimed," also favored an
express provision abolishing basing point pricing systems, because these latter are
destructive of primary line competition. See H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 9, 11-14 (1936).
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CIVIL PROCEDURE-DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER ADVANCING
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIM FOR TRIAL TO T COURT PRIOR TO
JURY TRIAL OF COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES HELD ABUSE OF
DISCRE~TION
Fox West Coast Theatres filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive
relief against petitioner, Beacon Theatres, to determine whether first-run
clearance agreements between Fox and its distributors were violative of the
antitrust laws I and to enjoin Beacon, pendente lite, from threatening or
instituting treble damage suits. Fox alleged that it was without adequate
remedy at law and that Beacon's threats were depriving it of a valuable
property right, that of negotiating in competition with Beacon and other
theatres for first-run clearance contracts. Beacon denied the threats and
filed a counterclaim 2 and a crossclaim against a distributor who had
intervened, alleging conspiracy between Fox and its distributors in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.3 Respondent district judge, viewing Fox's com-
plaint as essentially equitable, ordered trial of the declaratory judgment and
injunction causes to the court prior to jury determination of the antitrust
counterclaim, 4 and Beacon sought mandamus to require the judge to
vacate the order on the ground that it was entitled to a jury trial of those
issues common to its counterclaim and Fox's petition for equitable relief.5
While recognizing that res judicata or collateral estoppel might deny
Beacon jury trial on overlapping issues, the circuit court0 held that
respondent judge had not abused his discretion as to the sequence of trial.
The Supreme Court, reversing, held that, since the Declaratory Judgment
Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have affected the scope of
equity by expanding adequate legal remedies, "only under the most impera-
tive circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures
of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial
of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims." '
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500 (1959).
The Declaratory Judgment Act, like the Federal Rules, has neither
enlarged nor diminished the substantive rights of litigants. It has merely
provided a procedural device for the efficient determination of substantive
legal relationships.8 The act allows the declaration of "the rights and
'United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 344 U.S. 131, affirming in part and
reversing in part, 70 F. Supp. 53; 66 F. Supp. 323; subsequent proceedings in the
district court, 85 F. Supp. 881.
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
3 Sherman Anti-trust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2
(1958); Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958) (authorizing suits
for treble damages against Sherman Act violators).
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b), 57.
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 38, 39.
6 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 359 U.S.
500 (1959).
7 359 U.S. at 510.
s Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) ; BORCHARD, DECLARA-
TORY JUDGMENTS 277-92 (2d ed. 1941).
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other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 9  An action for
declaratory judgment is not inherently either legal or equitable but its
character will be determined by the affinity of its specific issues to those
traditionally conceived as legal or equitable. 10 Federal Rule 57, which
permits a declaratory judgment action to be advanced on the calendar for
speedy hearing, provides that declaratory judgments will remain subject
to the right of jury trial preserved by rule 38(a)." Therefore the declara-
tory judgment form does not itself operate to deprive a party of his right
to jury trial of issues having a legal aspect, but the involvement in the
action of components of an equitable character or the addition of a petition
for equitable relief may have that effect. Of course a plaintiff in a
declaratory judgment action with a petition for injunctive relief may not
deprive a defendant of jury trial on a legal counterclaim merely by getting
into court first.12 Procedures are available for separate trial of separate
claims.' 3 But in the special context of a case comporting mingled legal and
equitable elements, the principle of res judicata, making the first final
determination of an issue conclusive as between the parties, subjects the
realization of the right of jury trial to dependence upon the order in which
the claims are tried.14 Trial sequence, then, becomes a matter of funda-
mental importance.
Federal Rule 42 (b), provides that "the court in furtherance of conven-
ience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-
claim, [or] counterclaim . . . ." Different tests have been propounded
by the courts in assessing the exercise of the discretion preserved to the
trial judge by this rule. Some have held that the trial court has absolute
discretion in ordering either equitable or legal issues to be tried first.' 5 It
has also been held that equity has priority.'6 Other courts have concluded
that the basic nature of the issue must determine whether trial to the court
or trial to a jury is to be had first.17
928 U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. V, 1958).
10 BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 8, at 399-404.
"1In Schaefer v. Gunzburg, 246 F.2d 11, 15 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
831 (1957), the circuit court said: "This court is firmly committed to the doctrine
that the constitutional right to jury trial should not be eroded by a flow of decisions
giving force to dubious waivers and rationalized construction of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. However, it is not the purpose to expand the strict concept
of a law action by rationalization beyond that covered by the constitutional guaranty."
12 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321 (4th Cir. 1937); BORCHARD,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 400; Borchard, Declaratory Judgments and Insurance Liti-
gation, 34 ILL. L. Rlv. 245, 258 (1938-40).
13 FED. R. CIrv. P. 42(b).
14 See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.03 (1st ed. 1938).
15 "The order of trial is in the discretion of the district judge." Orenstein v.
United States, 191 F.2d 184, 190 (1st Cir. 1951); Federal Reserve Bank v. Idaho
Grimm Alfalfa Seed Grower's Ass'n, 8 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270
U.S. 646 (1926).
16 Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 242 (1922); Mather v.
Ford Motor Co., 40 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
17 General Motors Corp. v. California Research Corp., 9 F.R.D. 565 (D. Del.
1949); 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICES, 1138.16, 3829, at 213 (2d ed. 1951). The
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In American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart,18 the Supreme Court laid down
a rule of discretion by which the trial court would weigh such factors as
the condition of its calendar, the question whether a petitioner had been
precipitate or its adversary dilatory, and the balance of hardship as between
the litigants.' 9 The circuit court in the instant case invoked this test, but
the Supreme Court disposed of Stewart as an instance of "precedents
decided under discarded procedures." 20 Rather, the Court preferred the
authority of Leimer v. Woods,21 an Eighth Circuit case stating that only
"special reasons or impelling considerations" will allow prior trial to the
court of common issues of fact 2 2 but without indicating what such con-
siderations might be. Thus the Court concluded that the trial judge's
discretion "is very narrowly limited and must, wherever possible, be
exercised to preserve jury trial." 2
Many of the cases to come before the courts for declaratory judgment
have been brought by insurance companies to establish non-liability.24
Often the insured or a third party has counterclaimed on the policy, and
the courts have had to determine whether a jury trial or trial to the court
has priority when legal and equitable issues are involved.2 Where the
policy has matured, the courts have generally taken the view that the
insured has a right to jury trial before any court determination of issues
going to rescission or breach of contract, the insurer being said to have
anticipated suit on the policy with what are basically defenses to the legal
claim.26  Only where the policy has not matured, so that the insured has
yet no cause of action, is a petition for declaration of non-liability considered
equitable in nature and held to comport no attendant right to prior jury
trial.27 This is so because the insurer's action is not here an anticipatory
substitute for a legal defense, but rather a demand for relief where no
adequate remedy at law exists.28 Another group of cases has involved
circuit court in the instant case appeared to adopt this latter rule, declaring: "If
basically the nature of the plaintiff's complaint is one which alleges facts appropriate
to a suit in equity, . . . the court is presented with a claim the basic nature of which
is equitable, and it is of no consequence that some of the fact issues might under
different circumstances be appropriate fact issues in an action at law." 252 F.2d
at 877.
18 300 U.S. 203 (1937).
19 Id. at 215-16.
20 Instant case at 507.
21 196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1952), disapproving Orenstein v. United States, 191
F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1951).
22 196 F.2d at 836.
2 Instant case at 510.
2 4 Borchard, supra note 12, at 246, 250. See Johnson v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 238
F2d 322 (8th Cir. 1956), and cases cited therein.
25 Such a counterclaim is compulsory in the federal courts. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Little Rock Basket Co., 14 F.R.D. 381 (E.D. Ark. 1953).
26 Dickinson v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 147 F.2d 396, 397 (9th
Cir. 1945) ; Pacific Indem. Co. v. McDonald, 107 F.2d 446, 448 (9th Cir. 1939).2 7 Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Candimat Co., 83 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Md.
1949).
285 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIC E 38.16 (2d ed. 1951).
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patent disputes: petitioners have sought declarations of non-infringement
and patentees have counterclaimed for damages.29  Viewing these cases,
again, as merely anticipatory-in effect previsaging infringement actions-
the courts have determined that the patentee has a right to prior jury trial
of common issues.30 Presumably by similar reasoning, the Supreme Court
in the instant case considered Fox's complaint as in the nature of a defense
to charges of antitrust violations and, being such, as only an attempt to
secure an immunity which could be as certainly and as effectively secured
by permitting Fox the opportunity to maintain just such a defense to legal
action. Thus, in so far as "the expansion of adequate legal remedies pro-
vided by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules necessarily
affects the scope of equity," 31 the antecedent equitable determination of
issues common to Fox's and Beacon's claims became unnecessary and
improper.
Since enhanced legal remedies afforded by the Declaratory Judgment
Act and the Federal Rules provide the basis for the Court's holding, and
especially inasmuch as the Court, while severely limiting the trial judge's
discretion under rule 42(b),3 has still left the back door open for prior
nonjury determination in "cases where the availability of declaratory judg-
ment or joinder in one suit of legal and equitable causes would not in all
respects protect the plaintiff seeking equitable relief from irreparable harm
while affording a jury trial in the legal cause," 3 it becomes essential to
examine just where adequate remedy does and does not lie under the act
and the rules. The Court's language3 4 and its reliance on the insurance
cases3 3 suggest that it conceives the new-found adequacy as residing merely
in Fox's ability to force his adversary into court 2 6 and in the power of that
court to grant a full range of equitable and legal relief in a single action.
But Fox's situation in this regard is very different than that of the insurer
or even of the possible patent infringer. The interest of the insurer is in
fact quite fully protected simply by getting litigation started, although final
resolution may not immediately follow. The insurer benefits from an
anticipatory suit in that evidence will not be lost, or witnesses disappear,
or the time of attack under "incontestable" clauses 37 run, through the
29 E.g., General Motors Corp. v. California Research Corp., 9 F.R.D. 565 (D.
Del. 1949); Ryan Distrib. Corp. v. Caley, 51 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
3 0 E.g., Lisle Mills, Inc. v. Arkay Infants Wear, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 676 (E.D.
N.Y. 1950); Eastman Kodak Co. v. McAuley, 2 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
31 Instant case at 509.
32 See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
3Ibid. See also note 7 mipra and accompanying text.
3 4 See note 33 supra and accompanying text. See also instant case at 508.
35 The Court cites several insurance cases as examples of a potential defendant
coming into court with a declaratory judgment petition in anticipation of a damage
suit. Instant case at 504 n.4.
36 For a discussion of the remedial nature of a declaratory judgment see generally
BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 8, at 277-92.
37 An incontestable clause in a life insurance policy is one which fixes a time
limit after which the insurer may not contest the policy on the grounds of fraudulent
procurement. Before the Declaratory Judgment Act such a contest could obtain a
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dilatory practices of the insured or third party claimant; and the insurer's
continued business operatiorf is not hampered or rendered insecure pending
termination of a damage claim. But what Fox seeks is freedom to carry
on contractual negotiations essential to the going conduct of its business
unobstructed by those menaces of treble damage action by which Beacon
is apparently successfully threatening Fox distributors. The impediment
to Fox's affairs is immediate, and will continue throughout the interim
between institution and termination of the antitrust action set up by the
counterclaim, with its attendant years of preparation, pretrial, trial and
possible appeal. Not until final judgment can Fox assure its distributors
immunity; 38 Beacon's threats-even if they do not recur pendente lite 39 _
continue effectively to impair Fox's competitive position. Admittedly, in
many regards the position of the alleged patent infringer is not dissimilar:
constant crescence of possible liability hampers his current activity, and
patent-like antitrust-litigation tends to be protracted. Yet the burden
on Fox is considerably greater than on the alleged infringer because Fox
timely trial in equity as a suit for cancellation, the insurer having no adequate relief
in law as the limitation ran. American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937).
38 Fox is seeking both an injunction to stop Beacon's threats and an adjudication
by declaratory judgment to secure distributors that they will not subsequently be
held liable in a treble damage action if they continue to contract with Fox. The
injunction, if granted, will eliminate further threats, but the declaration is necessary
if the distributors are to be assured of permanent antitrust immunity. The question
may be asked as to how the distributors can in any event be assured of subsequent
immunity in view of the fact that, although the determination of antitrust violation
vel non will be final as between Beacon and Fox, the declaration will not be res
judicata as between Beacon and distributors not parties to the instant action. Further,
the decision will not stand even as stare decisis in a subsequent suit because the issue
involved is one of fact for the jury. Instant case at 504. However, the tactical effect
of an adjudication of non-violation as an implement to Fox's future negotiation of
clearance contracts-even if that adjudication be not conclusive as to distributor
liability---cannot be ignored. Moreover, argument could be made that such an adjudi-
cation would in fact secure to contracting distributors a definitive legal immunity
from Sherman Act responsibility predicated upon the Fox contracts. By analogy to
well-established principles of criminal law, the exoneration of Fox upon charges of
conspiracy based solely on the contracts themselves would free the distributors from
fear of liability based on the same contracts. In the law of conspiracy, the absolution
of one alleged conspirator forecloses conviction of another for conspiring with the
first: it has often been held that one cannot conspire with himself. Morrison v. Cali-
fornia, 291 U.S. 82 (1933) ; Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932) ; Turinetti
v. United States, 2 F.2d 15 (8th Cir. 1924); Williams v. United States, 282 Fed.
481 (4th Cir. 1922). Similarly, under the Sherman Act where proof of contract,
combination, or conspiracy is requisite (Nelson Radio & Supply, Inc. v. Motorola,
Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Cape Cod Food Products, Inc. v. National Cran-
berry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 900 (D. Mass. 1954); Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook
Amusement Co., 94 F. Supp. 388 (D. Md.), aff'd, 189 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1951))
the exculpation of Fox may insulate those who contract with it, at least insofar as
the mere execution of the contract goes.
39 Fox's needs may be supplied, the Court reasons, by temporarily enjoining
Beacon's threats of suit pending the outcome of the antitrust litigation. That is to
imply that those with whom Fox contracts will forget about past threats as long as
they are not reminded by recurrence. But a temporary injunction will not make
Fox's distributors any more eager to contract with it for first-run clearances at the
risk of enhancing their own damages in later antitrust suits. And, as long as
Beacon's threats are successful in frightening off Fox's distributors, there is no
reason to believe that Beacon would institute other actions or press for the speedy
resolution of this one.
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is not free to assume the option of taking the risk of continued operation;
the pressure upon him derives from the fears of third parties whom his
own confidence in the strength of his legal position may fail to convince.40
Thus Fox can avoid giving up its clearance contracts only if it is willing
to agree to indemnify distributors against losses arising from antitrust action
-- an enormous burden in view of the treble damage measure of liability.
Also unlike the alleged infringer, Fox is inevitably damaged despite the
potential merit of its cause; successful defense exonerates the former of
liability, while the latter, whether or not it wins in the antitrust case itself,
has lost the power freely to contract in the interim. And obviously the
court's authority under the rules to try in a single action both legal and
equitable causes and to decree, at the possibly long-delayed end of the
litigation, all relief appropriate as between the parties 41 similarly fails to
supply Fox's immediate needs. It appears, then, that if opportunity for
bringing Beacon into court and there securing a full scope of equitable
relief is the sum of the benefits which the new procedures extend to Fox,
refusal of his petition for prior trial to the court is hardly justifiable on
grounds of adequacy of remedy.4
But the rules provide still further procedural redress to parties in the
situation of Fox. Rule 57 permits the trial court to advance all declaratory
judgment causes on the calendar for speedy hearing. And, whereas such
advancement alone would not afford Fox a timely resolution of its case so
long as the declaratory suit is inextricably bound up in the antitrust action,43
rule 42(b) supplies the court, in its discretion, power to "order a separate
trial of any claim, . . . or of any separate issue or any number of claims
40 It may be argued that Fox and its distributors could together put themselves
in a position analogous to that of the alleged patent infringer through the intervention
of the distributors in the pending litigation. But, even aside from trie unlikeliness
that the distributors would welcome the opportunity to intervene in a declaratory
judgment action with an almost inevitable-because compulsory--counterclaim for
treble damages, Fox would still be left on its own in attempting to contract with other
distributors who, having had no prior contracts with Fox, were not brought under
the shelter of judgment in the first Beacon action. It is, therefore, impossible for
Fox to secure the measure of economic self-determination of the alleged patent
infringer.
41 This power is relied upon by the Court as one of the "remedies now made
available by . . . the Federal Rules." Instant case at 508, 509. See F .. R. Civ.
P. 1, 2, 18.
42"The remedy at law, in order to exclude a concurrent remedy at equity, must
be as complete, as practical, and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt
administration, as the remedy in equity." Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water
Co., 172 U.S. 1, 12 (1898). That the possible severe injury to Fox of delaying relief
until the termination of a long antitrust trial outweighs the injury to Beacon of a
trial to the court seems true despite the Court's legitimate concern lest the compulsory
counterclaim rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), abrogate plaintiff's constitutionally pro-
tected right to jury trial. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII. Note that, while the Supreme
Court assumes there are issues common to both complaint and counterclaim, instant
case at 503-04, the respondent had argued that the issue of substantial competition
actually may not be a material issue of fact common to both the equitable claim and
the counterclaim for damages. Instant case at 513 n.4 (dissent) ; Brief for Respondent,
pp. 25-30.
4The issue of competition between the two theaters, the only jury issue common
to both the equitable claim and the legal counterclaim, is only one of many such issues
in Beacon's antitrust action. Beacon alleged that Fox and the distributors conspired
together in restraint of trade and to monopolize first-run showings.
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• . . or issues." This was the provision in fact invoked by Fox in its
attempt to secure immediate trial of its claim to the court; but the device
might also be used, as Fox did not seek to use it, to secure a separate,
advanced jury trial.44 By such a trial of the single issue common to plain-
tiff's and defendant's causes 4 5 immediate relief might be supplied to the
former without curtailment of the latter's right to jury determination. Thus
the full battery of procedures available under the Declaratory Judgment Act
and the rules do indeed provide a remedy fully adequate to Fox's needs.
They seem to support not only the holding of the instant case, but also the
Court's intimation 46 that in few cases, if any, will sufficient cause be found
for curtailing jury trial by prior court adjudication of overlapping issues.
JURISDICTION-FOREIGN CORPORION HELD NOT SUBJECT TO
IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION WHERE ACTIVITIES IN FoRuM DID
NOT DIRECTLY GIVE RISE TO CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiff, an Arizona corporation which had subcontracted to construct
the flooring in an Arizona housing development, brought a diversity action
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California,
alleging breach of contract, breach of implied warranty of fitness, and mis-
representation in furnishing oak flooring blocks, against the California
wholesaler and the Louisiana manufacturer. Learning that plaintiff pur-
chaser's contract with the general contractor provided for the use of the
named manufacturer's block, the wholesaler had apparently obtained a price
quotation from the manufacturer and then approached plaintiff, offering
to sell the required lot of block. Plaintiff and wholesaler then entered
into a contract, by the terms of which the flooring block was to be deliv-
ered from the manufacturer's Louisiana factory directly to the job site in
Arizona without ever passing through California. The wholesaler then
ordered the block from the manufacturer, which order was accepted at the
manufacturer's Louisiana offices. This order called for delivery of one
carload, or about a quarter of the total order, in approximately five weeks,
further shipping schedules to be supplied at a later date. Several months
went by without a request for delivery, whereupon the manufacturer's
sales manager called on plaintiff's sales and production manager in the
latter's Los Angeles offices and stated that the delay in shipment was
inconveniencing his company to such an extent that it was considering
cancelling the order unless shipment was requested. In order to avoid
cancellation, plaintiff agreed to accept a carload of the flooring immediately,
and ultimately two carloads containing nearly half of the total amount of
material contracted for were delivered to the job site. Though the whole-
saler was a distributor or factory representative of the manufacturer in
44 See Sogmose Realties, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 15 F.R.D.
496 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Hall Labs., Inc. v. National Aluminate Corp., 95 F. Supp. 323
(D. Del. 1951).
45 See note 43 supra.
46 Instant case at 510-11.
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California, the manufacturer had entered into exclusive sales agreements
with three other distributors in the Los Angeles area which would have
prevented the manufacturer from shipping its goods into Southern Cali-
fornia on the order of the wholesaler.' The manufacturer shipped at least
$1,000,000 of merchandise into California each year through its appointed
dealers, but such merchandise had no direct connection with the contract
in this case; samples of its products were exhibited at California home
shows and fairs, and it carried on correspondence with its California
representatives and distributors, who, like the wholesaler in this suit, were
independent contractors buying from the manufacturer and reselling at a
price set by themselves. The manufacturer's products were advertised in
magazines read in California, and a small per cent of the receipts of each
sale was deducted from the manufacturer's price to support a non-profit
corporation whose purpose was to promote the use of hardwood flooring
in California. Seeking to indemnify itself, the wholesaler filed a cross-
claim against the manufacturer. 2  Upon motion by the manufacturer, the
district court dismissed the complaint as to it for lack of jurisdiction and
quashed service of process. 3  The court of appeals affirmed, holding that
because the defendant had neither transacted substantial business in Cali-
fornia nor performed within its borders any purposeful act sufficient to
give defendant a legally protected right and at the same time giving rise
to the cause of action sued on, the complaint was properly dismissed. L. D.
Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959).
In determining when a foreign corporation is amenable to the juris-
diction of the forum by virtue of its activities there,4 pertinent precedents
for the instant ruling are federal cases marking off the bounds within which
the exercise of judicial jurisdiction does not violate due process, and Cali-
' Affidavits of the officers of these distributors show that from 1951 to the summer
of 1954, the manufacturer had had one exclusive distributor in southern California.
The contracts here in issue were made in October and November of 1954. In the
summer of 1954, two additional wholesalers had been given distributorships, both by
oral agreements made in California between the new distributors and the manufac-
turer's vice president in charge of sales. Compare these circumstances with those
in Carl F. W. Borg~vard G.M.B.H. v. Superior Court, 330 P.2d 789 (Cal. 1958).
2 Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 3. This fact does not appear in the opinion.
3 Process was purportedly served on the manufacturer by service upon the presi-
dent of the codefendant corporate wholesaler on the theory that the wholesaler was
an agent of the manufacturer in the State of California. The manufacturer filed affi-
davits specifically denying such agency and contending that the wholesaler was an
independent contractor. CAL. CORP. CODE § 6500 provides that process may be served
on a foreign corporation by personal service on its "general manager in this State."
4 In addition to the question of the legitimacy of jurisdiction, there was raised
the issue, also decided against the plaintiff, of whether the service of process was
sufficient. This issue alone would be determinative of the appeal, but it is logically
subsidiary to the broader question of jurisdiction. If the corporation is once held to be
doing business in the state, see note 5 infra, service of process could be had either upon
an officer of the corporation or upon its general manager in the state, as was attempted
here, or upon an agent designated by the corporation (CAL. CORP. CODE § 6500) ; and if
no such agent could be found, service could be had upon the Secretary of State (CAL.
CORP. CODE § 6501). The critical issue is thus one of substance, and not of the
mechanical procedure by which process may be served.
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fornia decisions indicating the manner in which that state, utilizing its
power to the limit of those bounds, assumes jurisdiction over corporate
non-residents.5 At one time the Supreme Court had held that the sole
permissible basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant was the
physical power of the forum.0 Over many years, however, this doctrine
was eroded by decisions which, while purporting to recognize its prin-
ciple, in fact avoided it by fictive concepts such as "consent," 7 "presence,"
and "doing business," until finally the Court's holding in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,9 repudiating the then prevailing fictions, 10 became
a new point of departure.11 Even so this landmark case did not provide
5 Whether judicial jurisdiction in federal court diversity actions is governed by
the Erie doctrine has not yet been settled by the Supreme Court. The conflict-of-laws
issue was not expressly discussed by the instant court, which nevertheless considered
both federal and California decisions as authorities. FED. R. Civ. P. 4 provides that
a foreign corporation may be served by process issued by a district court "in the
manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the service is made for the service
of summons or other like process upon any such defendant in an action brought in
the courts of general jurisdiction of that state." One interpretation of this rule makes
amenability to suit a preliminary part of "manner of service," and therefore makes
state law the test of judicial jurisdiction. Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170
F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948). See 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 4.25 (2d ed. 1948) and
14.25 at 970, nn.2 & 3 (2d ed. Supp. 1958) ; Schwartz, Federal Court Application of
the "Doing Business" Test in Diversity Cases, 5 DuKE B.J. 129 (1956). Note,
Doing Business as a Test of Venue and Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations in
the Federal Courts, 56 COLUm. L. Rv. 394, 398 n.27 (1956), states that circuits 3, 5,
7 and probably 1 favor state tests, 2 and 6 favor a federal test, and the others are
unclear. See also Note, Federal and State Precedents on Doing Business: Jurisdic-
tion Over Foreign Corporations Under Erie, 67 YALE L.J. 1094 (1958). Of course,
where state law is applied to test jurisdiction, that law must itself be tested under
the due process requirements of the federal constitution. Kenny v. Alaska Airlines,
Inc., 132 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Cal. 1955). Cf. Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co.,
supra. And see, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ; McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). California law extending its judicial jurisdiction
to nonresident corporations "doing business" in the state (CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 411)
is in any event read as stretching to the fullest permissible limits of due process,
Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 858-59, 323 P.2d 437,
439 (1958), so that the state and federal tests become coincident, "doing business" in
California being satisfied by the same "minimal contracts" which permit the exercise
of jurisdiction consistent with U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. See 106 U. PA. L. Rzv.
1049, 1053 (1958).
0 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
7 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855) ; St. Clair v. Cox,
106 U.S. 350 (1882) (dictum).
s Bank of America v. Whitney Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923); Philadelphia & R.
Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 579 (1914) ; St Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913). See Isaacs,
An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 1018, 1028 (1925).
9326 U.S. 310 (1945).
10 The fictions had become by then quite transparent. See Pennsylvania Fire Ins.
Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917) (Holmes, J.); Hutchinson
v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.); Smolik v.
Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (L. Hand, J.) ;
Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 111 N.E. 1075
(1916) (Cardozo, J.).
31 O'Connor & Goff, Expanded Concepts of State Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents,
31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 223, 227-28 (1956) ; Note, The Growth of the International
Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. CHl. L. REv. 523, 524-25 (1949).
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clear categorical rules for future application, 12 but attempted only to
establish a few broad guide marks couched in terms of policy.13 Subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions each settling a small area of the law have
begun the long process of mapping out the wide judicial terrain thrown
open by the opinion in International Shoe.14  It is at least evident that the
Court deals with problems of judicial jurisdiction in terms of the sufficiency
of contact between defendant and forum: the existence vel non of such
contacts is the one broad question which must be decided in each case
where jurisdiction is to attach. 15 But though the decisions following
International Shoe have "revealed some if not all of the factors which are
to be taken into consideration in reaching a conclusion on the issue of in
personam jurisdiction," they "do not reveal how each factor is to be
weighed in combination with the others." 16 Thus no satisfactory synthesis
has yet been made by the Court or by anyone else.
17
At best, then, it is possible to deduce from what the Court has deemed
sufficient contact those considerations which may be important in holding,
a foreign corporation amenable to suit. Two well recognized elements
are the type 18 and amount 19 of activity of the corporation in the forum.
12 See Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of
Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. Rav. 249, 252 (1959).
13 "Whether due process is satisfied must depend . . . upon the quality and
nature of the activity [of the corporation] in relation to the fair and orderly adminis-
tration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure."
326 U.S. at 319.
'4 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957) ; Polizzi v.
Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663 (1953) ; Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp.
Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). For a survey of these cases, see Kurland, The Supreme
Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personain Jurisdiction of State Courts-
From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHL L. Rav. 569 (1958). Also see
generally O'Connor & Goff, supra note 11; Reese & Galston, supra note 12; 37
CORN EL L.Q. 458 (1952).
15 Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 14, at 251.
10 Kurland, supra note 14, at 623.
17 Ibid.
18 Compare McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (after
solicitation by mail, reinsurance certificate delivered in forum), with Perkins v. Ben-
guet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (president maintained office, paid
salaries, bought machinery; local bank acted as stock transfer agent). Compare
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (solicitation for sale of
shoes to be delivered in state), with MacInnes v. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 257
F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1958), and Miller v. Surf Properties, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 475, 151 N.E.2d
874, 176 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1958) (solicitation for sale of out-of-state hotel accommoda-
tions). See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra at 317-19; MacInes v.
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp, supra at 833-34; Joseph Walker & Sons v. Lehigh Coal
& Nay. Co., 8 Misc. 2d 1005, 167 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Smyth v. Twin
State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951). See Lacey, Solicitation
as Doing Business-A Review of New York and Federal Cases, 18 FORDHAm L. REv.
204 (1949) ; Note, Recent Interpretations of "Doing Business" Statutes, 44 IowA L.
REv. 345, 350-51 (1959). Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations-an Analy-
sis of Due Process, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 381, 387-90, 403 (1955), points out that a type
of activity which benefits the defendant is more apt to confer jurisdiction.
19 Recognition of this factor anteceded International Shoe. See Missouri, K. &
Tex. Ry. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921), affirming 233 Mass. 32, 123 N.E. 235
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Another is the extent to which the cause of action in suit arises from such
activity.20  The means by which the activity is achieved-whether by an
officer, agent, independent distributor, subsidiary, or by mail-is often
relevant,2 1 as is the foreseeability of juridical consequences which may
require invoking the process of the courts.2 2  The interest of the state in
regulating the particular type of activity involved,23 the question whether
(1919) ; International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) ; Green v. Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). More recently see Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes
Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,
245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 85, comment a (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1956). The total quantum of activity
is frequently at the root of decisions considering activities "continuous and systematic
in their nature." See, e.g., Fiore v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 157 F. Supp. 572
(E.D. Mo. 1957). Hoffman, The Plastic Frontiers of State Judicial Power Over
Non-Residents: McGee v. International Life Instirance Company, 24 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 291, 292, 294-95 (1958), states that International Shoe did not dispose of all
quantitative tests, but rather substituted a new quantitative test which included other
considerations. See Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Non-Residents in
Our Federal System, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 196, 200-01 (1957) ; Note, Jurisdiction Over
Nonresident Corporations Based on a Single Act: A New Sole for International Shoe,
47 GEo. LJ. 342, 348 (1958) ; Note, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 523, 529 (1949).
2
0 The Supreme Court has several times discussed the importance of causal con-
nection betveen defendant's in-forum activity and the facts giving rise to plaintiff's
claim. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957) : Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1945). But in Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), jurisdiction was permitted on a
cause of action which did not arise from, and was not related to, the activities of the
defendant in the forum. That a causal connection may in some cases be required
has been recognized by the states. See, e.g., Peters v. Robin Airlines, 281 App. Div.
903, 120 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1953). Respect for this requirement appears inherent in the
so-called "single act" statutes which provide for jurisdiction over causes of action
arising from a foreign corporation's activities within the state: e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7,
§ 199(1) (Supp. 1951) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956) ; MD. ANN.
CODE art. 23, §§ 88, 92 (1957); N.Y. CIrv. PRAc. ACT § 1217-a; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-145 (Supp. 1957) ; -PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 15, § 2852-1011 (1958); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 3083 (Supp. 1959). See Hoffman, supra note 19, at 301-02; Reese & Galston,
supra note 12, at 265-67; Sobeloff, mpra note 19, at 208; Note, 47 GEo. L.J. 342,
353-55 (1958) ; Note, 44 IowA L. REv. 345, 354 (1959) ; Note, Jurisdiction Expanded
-The Illinois Civil Practice Act, 44 IowA L. REv. 361 (1959) ; Note, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 381, 384-87 (1955).
21 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., supra note 20, where the cor-
poration president carried out the activities. But see Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950). It is not, however,
necessary that an agent or employee be present in the forum, so long as the corporate
purpose is achieved. French v. Gibbs Corp., 189 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1951); Sales
Affiliates, Inc. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 134, 136, 214 P.2d 541, 542 (2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1950) ; Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 210 F.2d 908 (7th Cir. 1954) (dictum).
The significance for jurisdiction of the means by which the nonresident corporation
carries out activities has been noted in Note, 44 IowA L. REv. 345, 356-59 (1959);
Note, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 381, 399-406 (1955).
22 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, supra note 21; International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) ; W. H.
Elliott & Sons Co. v. Nuodex Prods. Co., 243 F.2d 116 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 823 (1957). But see Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502 (4th
Cir. 1956).
23 The states have a particular interest in insurance regulation. McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co., supra note 22; Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel.
State Corp. Comm'n, supra note 22; Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S.
313 (1943); Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
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the plaintiff is a resident of the forum, 24 the burden upon defendant of
defending away from home, 25 and the general trial efficiency achieved by
holding trial where the evidence is close at hand 26 have all received con-
sideration. Closely related to these factors is the ease of access to an
alternative forum.27  Finally, the relationship between the defendant cor-
poration and the person upon whom process is served in the forum-
whether an officer, appointed agent, general manager in the state, salesman,
or the secretary of state--is perhaps significant.
28
Although these elements have not yet been synthesized into any mean-
ingful single formula relating them all inter'sese, a number of relation-
ships between their several variable groups are manifest. Some degree of
concomitance obviously arises from the nature of the elements themselves:
thus, the burden of defending is often directly related to the question of
trial efficiency or location of evidence.2 0  Location of evidence is likewise
related to the factor of causal connection between defendant's in-forum
activities and plaintiff's claim; if local activities gave rise to the cause
235, 252 (1958) (dictum). They are likewise especially interested in controlling
the sale of securities, Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935),
and the use of their highways, Hess v. Pawloski, supra note 22. Marriage and
domestic relations are subjects of state regulation, but in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,
354 U.S. 416 (1957), it was held that a state had no jurisdiction to cut off alimony
payments to a nonresident ex-wife who made no appearance. On the impact of a
prevalent local regulatory interest see Hoffman, supra note 19, at 306; Kurland,
supra note 14, at 608; Sobeloff, supra note 19, at 201; Note, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 381,
393-94 & n.60 (1955).
24 The state has a legitimate concern in providing a forum for its residents.
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra note 23, at 223; Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 259 (1958) (dissent of Black, J.). See also Parmalee v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 877 (1953).
In Parmalee v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 206 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1953),
the same statute involved in the preceding case was interpreted to require residency
before jurisdiction could be exercised.
2 5 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) ; Kilpatrick v.
Texas & P. Ry., 166 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 75 (1949) ;
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930). The factors
of burden of defending, trial efficiency, and alternative forum have often been lumped
together and considered as posing an issue analogous to that raised by a plea of forum
non conveniens. Instant case at 775. Listing factors pertinent to forum non con-
veniens, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See also Hoffman,
supra note 19, at 294, 304; Sobeloff, supra note 19, at 203.
6 See generally Note, 104 U. PA. L. Rn-. 381 (1955).
27 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) : the alternative
forum would have presumably been in the Philippine Islands. See Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950). Cf.,
Burt v. Isthmus Dev. Co., 218 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955), 103 U. PA. L. REv. 830
(1955); Comment, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 377 (1958).
28This factor, taken as an indicium of the affinity between the corporation and
the forum's courts, may have jurisdictional importance in addition to its significance
on the question of service; the two problems should not be confused. Compare
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., supra n6te 27 (corporate president served
in suit not related to the few activities carried on), with International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (salesman served in suit based on his
activities). The distinction here may represent a hangover from the concept of"presence"-a corporation is more apt to follow its president than its salesmen.
See discussion in instant case at 775; see cases cited note 25 supra.
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of action, evidence is apt to be largely local. 8° Similarly, the type and
extent of activity is related to location of evidence, and therefore to trial
efficiency.3 1 The interest of the state in regulating an activity is of course
related to the question of type of activity carried on in the forum, as it is
to the question of whether the plaintiff is a resident.32 Still other inter-
factor relationships arise from the judicial effort to strike a balance which
accords with "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' ":
comparison of the decisions reveals within the concept of sufficient contact
an inverse ratio between the nature of the requisite activity and its volume
or frequency. Thus the more juristically significant the activity, the less
may be its amount; amenability to suit is directly related to the product
of these two factors.3 4  This relationship and the intimacy of causal con-
nection between local activity and cause of action is implicitly recognized
in state statutes conferring jurisdiction on the basis of the commission of a
tort within the jurisdiction. 5 Specifically, the relationship between causal
connection and amount of activity has been critical at least at one extreme:
where jurisdiction is based on a single act,3 6 due process demands that that
act must give rise to the liabilities sued on.
3 7
The court in the instant case was aware of the recent work of com-
mentators who have discussed the importance of a causal relationship
between acts in the forum state and the basis of the suit, and it placed
great reliance in particular on one article38 which purports to set forth
30 Note, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 381, 390-93 (1955).
31 Id. at 396-97.
3 2 These factors tend to merge where the state is a party: Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 399 U.S. 643 (1950); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Compare Parmalee v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 877 (1953)
(jurisdiction permitted under controlling statute where insurance policy mailed to
resident), with Parmalee v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 206 F.2d 523
(5th Cir. 1953) (no jurisdiction under same statute where insurance policy mailed
to insured before he became a resident). The distinction between the latter two
cases depending on the construction of a statute, they are of course not authority as
to the due process bounds of jurisdiction. They do display, however, a state legislative
recognition of the relationship between the interest of the state and the residency of
the plaintiff.
33 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 32.
34 Compare McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (sale and
delivery of one re-insurance certificate sufficient basis for jurisdiction), with LeVecke
v. Griesedieck Western Brewing Co., 233 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1956) (brewer's large-
volume shipment to independent distributors insufficient to confer jurisdiction).
S5 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(b) (Smith-Hurd 1956), upheld in
Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957). See Cleary & Seder, Ex-
tended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 599, 609-10
(1955).
36 By "single act" in this context is excluded of course the manifestation of actual
consent to jurisdiction, whether by appointment of an agent to receive process, by
appearance, or otherwise.
37Reese & Galston, stpra note 12, at 264; Sobeloff, supra note 19, at 208.
38 Note, 47 GEo. LJ. 342 (1958). Instant case at 773 n.12, quotes this source:
"There are three rules which can be drawn from a combined reading of International
Shoe, McGee, and Hanson against which all future litigation of a like nature may be
tested." The second rule is: "The cause of action must be one which arises out of,
or results from, the activities of the defendant within the forum." Note, supra at 351.
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the rules under which a single act may confer jurisdiction. In this one-
act context, its author asserts as prerequisite that the activity in the
forum must create the liabilities sued on: there must be a direct causal
connection between the act and the cause of action.3 9 But although the
focus of attention of the article is single-contact jurisdiction, the court
accepted the rule set down as applicable to the case before it and rested
its decision largely on the absence of any such causal connection. Thus
the court failed to discern that where jurisdiction is based on a volume of
activity greater than a single act, a more tenuos degree or even complete
absence of causal connection has been consistently held not to defeat
jurisdiction.40  This initial mistaken premise adopted by the court
4 1
necessarily disrupted its subsequent appraisal of the significance of each
of those elements in support of jurisdiction which were present on the facts
of the case it had to decide.42 The court disregarded the substantial volume
of annual sales of the manufacturer in California, merely because they
had "no connection with the contract in this case." 43 The manufacturer's
arrangement with its distributors, its efforts to promote sales of its products
both by advertising and by personal contacts-all its general activities in
California-were similarly dismissed.44  In its search for activities within
39 Id. at 353-55.
40 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). Cf. W. H. Elliott
& Sons Co. v. Nuodex Prods. Co., 243 F.2d 116 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
823 (1957) (three opinions concurring in result). Judge Magruder's opinion ex-
pressed doubt that the amount of activity carried on was sufficient to subject the
corporation to suit on all actions, but found that there was enough connection between
the activities and the cause of action to permit jurisdiction in the particular case
under consideration. Instant case at 779 cites the district court decision, W. H.
Elliott & Sons Co. v. E. & F. King & Co., 144 F. Supp. 401 (D.N.H. 1956), as an
authority denying jurisdiction. The district court, however, was reversed on appeal.
243 F.2d 116.
41 The court's ruling appears to have been dictated in part by its unfortunate
reliance on rules which purported to apply only to the single-act situation, and in
part by its interpretation of language in Hanson v. Denckla: "The unilateral activity
of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy
the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will
vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws." 357 U.S. at 253. "The cause of action in this case is not
one that arises out of an act done or transaction consummated in the forum State."
357 U.S. at 251. From these words, the instant court concluded that: 1) an act of
the defendant must avail it of the forum's laws; 2) this same act must give rise to
the cause of action sued on; and 3) the cause of action must arise within the forum.
Instant case at 773. In fact, the second and third propositions are not deducible from
Hanson. The instant court realized that its reasoning was repugnant to the Perkins
holding, but was content to distinguish Perkins on its facts. In a pre-Hanson case,
the Ninth Circuit had recognized that causal connection is not always required.
LeVecke v. Griesedieck Western Brewing Co., 233 F.2d 772, 777-78 (9th Cir. 1956)
(dictum).
42 There are too few Supreme Court cases in this area of the law to provide an
apposite precedent for every combination of jurisdictional factors which lower courts
must treat. Until conclusive rules crystallize, the emphasis must be on the process
by which decision is reached. Kurland, From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25
U. CmI. L. Rzv. 569, 623 (1958).
43 Instant case at 774.
4Ibid.
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the forum directly giving rise to the cause of action, the court neglected
its duty to weigh all of those acts by which the defendant manufacturer
established contact with the forum state and then to assess that measure
as against the total nexus of other variables relevant to the jurisdiction
question.
Moreover, even within the limits of its first assumption, the court
seems to have erred again in its specific determination that the conference
of the manufacturer's sales manager with the plaintiff had no juridically
causal relation to the contract obligation which is the subject of suit.
45
In dismissing the conference as casual because subsequent to the establish-
ment of the contractual relation and thus merely "concerned with an already
vested right," 46 the court failed to appreciate the legal significance of the
possibility that the manufacturer might have been justified in rescinding
its contract with the wholesaler on the grounds of the latter's failure to
accept the goods per plaintiff 4 but that it in fact abandoned all thought
of cancellation upon plaintiff's agreement to accept immediate delivery.
Thus, although the contracts underlying the suit were not initially executed
in California, they may yet have been saved by juristic acts carried out
in that state by the manufacturer's agent at the manufacturer's instigation.
Since the manufacturer forbore cancelling on the strength of the plaintiff's
promise,48 it may even be that a promissory estoppel could subsequently
have been invoked to bind the plaintiff vis-i-vis the manufacturer to accept-
ance of delivery. 49 Thus perhaps a set of legal obligations as among the
4
5 Id. at 774, 775.
46 Id. at 774.
47 In the instant case the contract between the manufacturer and wholesaler pro-
vided for deliveries to start approximately five weeks from the date of contract; the
manufacturer was ready to deliver, but the plaintiff-purchaser was not prepared to
accept the block. As the wholesaler was in effect to take delivery in Arizona through
the plaintiff, the former may be deemed to have been in default on his contract with
the manufacturer. California law supports the proposition that a wrongful refusal
to accept delivery of goods contracted for justifies an action for damages or rescission:
CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1784-85. See Compania Engraw Commercial E. Industrial S.A.
v. Schenley Distillers Corp., 181 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Los Angeles Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Amalgamated Oil Co., 156 Cal. 776, 106 Pac. 55 (1909); Wilson v. Corrugated
Kraft Containers, Inc., 117 Cal. App. 2d 691, 256 P.2d 1012 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
Similar results would obtain under both Arizona and Louisiana law. Ariz. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 44-264, -265 (1955); Tovrea Equip. Co. v. Gobby, 72 Ariz. 38, 230
P.2d 512 (1951) (dictum); Boyd v. Second Hand Supply Co., 14 Ariz. 36, 123 Pac.
619 (1912). LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2549, 2555, 2561 (West 1952); Mengel Co.
v. Raziano, 57 So. 2d 48 (La. App. 1952); Prestige, Inc. v. Schwartzberg, Inc., 38
So. 2d 169 (La. App. 1949); Mossy Motors v. McRedmond, 12 So. 2d 719 (La. App.
1943) ; Wrenn v. Lafayette Furniture Co., 151 So. 148 (La. App. 1933); Leon
Godchaux Clothing Co. v. De Buys, 10 La. App. 635, 120 So. 539 (1929). The
statutory provisions in California and Arizona are identical, both enactments of UNI-
FORM SALES ACT §§64, 65. For a new approach to the conflict-of-laws problem
potentially involved, see Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L.
REv. 657 (1959).
48 Instant case at 770.
4 9 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) : "A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance of a definite and substantial char-
acter on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forebearance
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various parties at suit was affected 'by the manufacturer's own acts in the"
forum state; -certainly, at- the least, those acts exercised a considerable,
practical impact in furtherance of the consequent delivery of the goods
whose alleged substandard quality is the very subject of the action.;
Whether stch a relation of in-forum activity to cause of action does not,
satisfy even the court's own over-rigorous standard of causal connection
might be convincingly argued. Yet its fuller significance as an element in
support of jurisdiction becomes appreciable only when the causal connec-
tion, such as- it is, has been weighed and combined with the other factors"
which establish the whole pattern of defendant's contacts with the forum.
The rationale of decision-making which relies on the process of com-
bining jfirisdictional factors is- not new; both federal 50 and California 51
cotirts have employed it. Probably utilization of such a process is crucial"
if jurisdiction is to be found in the instant case, for although the point
is arguable it is doubtful that the activities of the manufacturer in setting
up and utilizing distributorships and in promoting the use of its products
in California were in themselves sufficient to afford a basis of jurisdiction
for causes of action wholly unrelated to them. On similar facts, jurisdic-
tion had previously been denied by the Ninth Circuit.52  And it is equally
doubtful-though again not unarguable-that the one set of negotiations
whereby the manufacturer may have bound plaintiff by a promissory
estoppel would, as a single isolated contact, provide sufficient jurisdictional
leverage. Although one lone contract may in certain circumstances con-
stitute an adequate contact with the forum, 53 a relationship grounded in
promissory estoppel could be deemed juristically something less than a
contract. 54 But when the product of the active nature and substantial
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." California
has adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal.
2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958) ; Edmonds v. County of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 642,
255 P.2d 772 (1953) ; Van Hook v. Waiters' Alliance, Local 17, 158 Cal. App. 2d
556, 323 P.2d 212 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Henry v. Weinman, 157 Cal. App. 2d
360, 321 P.2d 117 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Rennie & Laughlin Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 242 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1957) (dictum).
50 E.g., W. H. Elliott & Sons, Co. v. Nuodex Prods. Co., 243 F.2d 116 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
51 Carl F. W. Borgward G.M.B.H. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 172 330 P.2d
789 (1958) ; Duraladd Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 2d 226, 285 P.2d
699 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Martin Bros. Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 121 Cal.
App. 2d 790, 264 P.2d 183 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1953). The instant court distinguished
the facts of the Borgward case, supra, only insofar as it found in the instant case no
direct causal connection between in-forum activity and the facts giving rise to plain-
tiff's claim. In Borgward the distributorship was created by the contract at issue,
which had been negotiated in California.
52 LeVecke v. Griesedieck Western Brewing Co., 233 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1956).
See Note, 44 IowA L. REv. 345, 356-57 (1959), and cases collected at 357 rL61; Note,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 381, 399-403 (1955). But see Schilling v. Roux Distrib. Co.,
240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d 907 (1953) (acts of 10 employees in promoting sales sufficient
for jurisdiction of warranty action based on purchase from independent distributor).
53 Compania De Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357
(1954) (majority opinion), 108 A.2d 372 (1954) (dissenting in part), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 943 (1955), 22 U. CHi. L. REv. 674 (1955).
54 An estoppel, unlike a contract, does not mature into an enforceable right until
damage has been suffered.
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volume of the manufacturer's total California activity is added to the
product of the significance of the post-contractual negotiation and the-
degree of its closeness to the cause of action sued on, an adequate basis.
for the exercise-of jurisdiction seems to emerge. In sum, a foreign cor-
poration which had divided up the forum state into sales territories
serviced by independent distributors associated with it by contract, "and
which through these distributors had shipped $1,000,000 of merchandise.
into the state each year, which had its products advertised and exhibited.
there, and which sent its own sales manager to expedite a substantial
contract when that contract needed expediting, could be subjected to suit-
there on the matter of that contract without establishing a dangerous
precedent. 5 Had the activities of the manufacturer in California been
properly evaluated, 50 and considered conjunctively -so as to permit the
exercise of jurisdiction, the claims of the parties-now relegated for their
vindication to two separate lawsuits-could have been justly and efficiently
determined in a forum reasonably convenient for all.
PRODUCTION OF STATEMENTS-STATUTB GovERNiNG PRO-
DUCTION RULED EXCLUSIVE VEHICLE FOR PRODUCTION BY THE
GOVERNMENT
Petitioner was convicted in a federal district court of knowingly and
wilfully evading the payment of income taxes.1 After a government wit-
ness had testified, 2 petitioner, with a view to securing documents of poten-
tial value for his impeachment, demanded production of a signed transcript
of a first conference between the witness and Internal Revenue Agents, a
supplementary affidavit executed by the witness, and an agent's 600-word
memorandum, the summary of a second, three-and-a-half hour meeting
during which the two other papers were signed. The Government produced
the transcript and the affidavit, but the trial judge withheld the memo-
randum on the basis of the Jencks Act. The Second Circuit 4 and the
5r The instant court feared, unreasonably it seems, that to permit jurisdiction
"would in effect sanction the filing of suit in any federal district court in the United
States in whose geographical area a national distribution of manufactured products
was advertised, sold, or delivered, irrespective of where any contract which was
allegedly the basis of the lawsuit was negotiated or consummated." Instant case
at 779.
56 In further application of the factors discussed in text accompanying notes 18-28
supra, it may be remarked first, that although the original plaintiff, the purchaser,
was not a resident of California, the wholesaler, which filed a cross-claim for indemni-
fication against the manufacturer was; and second, that in view of the extent of its
total course of dealings in California, the defendant manufacturer can scarcely have
been altogether surprised to find itself called upon to defend in the courts of that state.
1 In violation of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 145(b), 53 Stat. 62.
2 A pre-trial demand for discovery was also made and denied, but was not argued
on appeal. United States v. Palermo, 21 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
3 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. V, 1958).
4 United States v. Palermo, 258 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1958).
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Supreme Court5 affirmed on the ground that the Jencks Act, governing
the production of statements, provided the exclusive means of defense
access to government-held documents and precluded production of the
requested memorandum since it was outside the scope of the statute.6
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
The proper scope of Government production of documents for possible
use in the impeachment of witnesses has been a recurring problem. Too
limited production may hinder an individual's defense while over-broad
production threatens interference with the Government's investigative
agencies.7 The rule for production of memoranda made not by the wit-
ness but by an agent, established in Goldinan v. United States,8 was that
such documents were producible at the discretion of the judge.9 Witness-
made documents, on the other hand, were produced to the defense under
a different rule. In Jencks v. United States,10 the Supreme Court reiter-
ated a distinction it had made initially in Gordon v. United States," between
the rules for production of witness-made documents and for their introduc-
tion into evidence.' 2  More stringent evidentiary rules were to be applied
to test admissibility, but for production purposes it had only to appear that
the documents sought related to the witness' testimony.' 3 Most sig-
nificantly, the Jencks Court held that not only was a preliminary foundation
of inconsistency between the documents sought and the witness' testi-
mony not required, but furthermore, that production of such documents
should be directly to the defense as a matter of right.' 4 The rationale of
Jencks was clearly explained. "Because only the defense is adequately
equipped to determine the effective use for purpose of discrediting the
Government's witness and thereby furthering the accused's defense, the
5 Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the court for five Justices. Mr.
Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion with three other Justices joining reasoning
that in the particular factual situation the lower court had correctly exercised its
discretion. At the same time three factually similar cases were affirmed by an equally
divided Court. Lev v. United States, 360 U.S. 470 (1959) ; Wool v. United States,
360 U.S. 470 (1959); Rubin v. United States, 360 U.S. 470 (1959). The question
presented by these cases was the same as that of the instant case, and the four cases
were consolidated for oral argument, 358 U.S. 903 (1959), and argued together, 27
U.S.L. WEEK 3307 (U.S. May 5, 1959).
6 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (Supp. V, 1958).
7 See notes 24, 25 infra
8 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
) Cases which involved memoranda as distinguished from statements have turned
on the exercise of the trial court's discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (grand jury notes to refresh witness' memory) ;
Kaufman v. United States, 163 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 857
(1948) (government investigator notes to refresh witness' memory).
10353 U.S. 657 (1957).
11344 U.S. 414 (1953).
12 "Demands for production and offers in evidence raise related issues but inde-
pendent ones, and production may sometimes be required though inspection may show
the document could properly be excluded." Id. at 418.
13 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669 (1957) ; Anderson v. United States,
262 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1959).
14 Jencks v. United States, supra note 13, at 666, 669.
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defense must initially be entitled to see them to determine what use may
be made of them. Justice requires no less." 15 Although the doctrine
was broadly expressed, the facts of the case, like those of Gordon, extended
production of right only to specific reports actually made by the witness. 16
And in requiring that the documents sought for production need relate
to the witness' testimony, Jencks, again like Gordon, seemed to prohibit
searching entire Government files in the hope of turning up a useful docu-
ment.17 Furthermore, the revelation of the reports in Jencks did not affect
Government security.' 8
Although the facts of Jencks made its holding a narrow and not novel
one,' 9 the case aroused severe reactions. A warning in the dissent 20 to
the effect that the decision would open complete F.B.I. files to inspection
by every defendant, created a fear of jeopardy of our national security
that was soon increased by over-broad generalizations in periodicals 2 ' and
by misapplications by lower courts and agencies 2 2 that to some extent
made the warning a valid one. Despite some interpretations by lower
courts which properly restricted the Jencks doctrine,2 3 Congress decided
that it was necessary to provide statutory rules for production to keep
Jencks in narrow form,24 rules which would at the same time preserve
the rights of individuals 2 5 and limit the scope within which Government
documents would be made accessible as of right to the defense. In the
haste of pending adjournment the Jencks Act was passed. It provided
for the production by the Government, after its witness had testified, of
certain enumerated types of statements-written statements by the witness
or recordings or transcriptions constituting substantially verbatim reports
of the witness' oral statements-only after an in camera inspection and ex-
1 Id. at 668-69.
1' Id. at 659.
17"The demand was for the production of these specific documents and did not
propose any broad or blind fishing expedition among documents possessed by the
Government on the chance that something impeaching might turn up." Gordon v.
United States, 344 U.S. 414, 419 (1953).
'sJencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1957).
"1 See, e.g., United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 920 (1952); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944);
United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952). See generally
Note, 3 S.D.L. Rzv. 167 (1958); Note, 11 STAN. L. REv. 297 (1959); Note, 67
YALE L.J. 674 (1958).
20Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 680 (1957) (Mr. Justice Clark dis-
senting).
21 See, e.g., 27 J.B.A. KAN. 232 (1958) ; 31 TiEr,. L.Q. 76 (1957).
22 See S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. App. (1957).
-3 See, e.g., United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 159 F. Supp. 860
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) ; United States v. Anderson, 154 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mo. 1957). The
latter case is approved as a correct application of Jencks in S. REP. No. 981, supra
note 22.
24 103 CONG. REc. 15919 (1957) (remarks of Senator Dirksen). The dangers
feared were: (1) possible misinterpretation of Jencks by the lower courts, (2) dis-
closure of F.B.I. files, (3) exposure of F.B.I. techniques, (4) revelation of confi-
dential sources.
25 103 CONG. REc. 15782 (1957) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney).
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dision of irrelevant passages.2 6 Both the majority and the concurring
2 7
'dpinions in the instant case found that memoranda or summaries by agents
are clearly outside the definition'of "statement" in subsection (e) 28 of the
act, -and thus that the language of the act did not speak to the problem of
production of the particular document sought in the instant case. But by
finding the act to be the exclusive authority for production, the majority
excluded the instant document, and at the same time erected the statutory
definition of "statement" into a categorical limitation upon the kind of
document of which the defense may secure examination. The concurring
Justices did not agree that the Jencks Act was the exclusive vehicle for
production; they believed that the court had retained the power in its
discretion to order production of papers falling without the statutory class,
but that the court had correctly exercised that discretion in excluding the
summary, since it was known in every important detail from the other
produced documents. Therefore they found no error prejudicial to the
defendant in denial of production. This conceptual difference is of funda-
mental importance.2 9
The majority opinion purported to find in legislative history a demon-
stration of congressional intent that the act be the exclusive means of
26The statute in subsections (a), (b), (c) and (d) provides for the production
of statements by the Government after the witness has testified, for the method for
excising irrelevant passages, and for the penalty in case of non-production. Sub-
section (e) provides: "The term 'statement,' as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d)
.of this section in relation to any witness called by the United States, means-(1) a
written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved
by him; or (2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement
made by said witness to an agent of the Government and recorded contemporaneously
with the making of such oral statement."
2T Instant case at 360.
28 See note 26 supra.
9 It should be remarked, however, that even under the majority view assigning
to the Jencks Act the quality of exclusiveness, that act will in many regards work no
repudiation of the pre-statutory law of production and impose no greater burden on
the defense. In view of its obvious curbs on the scope of the Jencks doctrine, it is
too easy to forget that the act nevertheless represents a congressional affirmation of
the major principle of Jencks-the right of the defense to secure access after testi-
mony to those of the witness' statements in the hands of the prosecution which relate
to the matters of his testimony, whether or not inconsistent with it-and that the act
will often produce the same result, both as to what it permits and what it prohibits,
that would have obtained under Jencks. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 262
F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1959) (statute held to prohibit sifting of government files from
top to bottom); United States v. De Lucia, 262 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1958) (statute
held test of degree of sufficiency of relevance between the sought documents and
witness' testimony). In other instances the act is concerned with problems not actually
controlled by the Jencks decision, and which might have been answered either in
harmony with the rationale of Jencks (see, e.g., United States v. Papworth, 156 F.
Supp. 842 (N.D. Tex. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1958) (production limited
to exclude entire work-product of agent, but allowing production only of relevant
parts for impeachment purposes) ; Johnston v. United States, 260 F.2d 345 (10th Cir.
1958) (production of documents allowable only after witness has testified)) or in
accord with other existent principles wholly outside the Jencks sphere of influence.
See, e.g., Bunn v. United States, 260 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1958) (denial of pre-trial
discovery under statute); United States v. Angelet, 255 F2d 383 (2d Cir. 1958)
(statute excludes grand jury testimony).
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production, and it is indeed true that Congress was concerned with all
documents insofar as their production would affect national security.30
It must be remembered, however, that congressional attention had been
focused by Jencks solely upon the problem of production directly to-the
defense as of right-production not subject to the exercise of judicial
-discretion after in camera examination by the court of the documents
-sought and opportunity for Government argument in objection to dis-
closure-production under the Jencks, not the Goldman, doctrine. Where
-there was any consideration whatever of the type of non-witness-made
documents previously producible in the trial court's discretion under
Goldman, that consideration concerned only the undesirability of revealing
irrelevant and confidential parts of a file or of a federal agent's work
product in a security context, not whether unusual circumstances might
-require discretionary production of other non-witness-made documents.31
Memoranda of the kind at issue in the instant case, neither previously
producible as of right under the Jencks rule for witness-made statements
nor related to the national security, appear not to have been within the
scope of congressional concern. And, similarly, whereas the majority
here also reasons that as Congress had provided strict rules for the pro-
duction of "statements," Congress could not intend to give "less reliable"
summaries a more favorable legal status, 32 it may be persuasively argued
.that to allow production, of summaries under pre-existing law does not
put them in a more favorable position than "statements" under the act,
-for the act provides the most liberal and inevitable type of production
-as of right-while the rule of Goldman is one only of discretion. -Fur-
ther, the final majority argument for the exclusiveness of the act-the
danger of misrepresentation and distortion inherent in summaries and
memoranda as selective condensations 3 3 -would appear to relate rather
to the introduction of this kind of document into evidence than to its
production; in any case, nowhere in the legislative history is there mani-
fested any feeling of a need to change the evidentiary laws to prevent
too free admission of purportedly misleading papers. In the light,- then,
of the events that brought the problem of production to Congress' atten-
tion and of the legislative history it seems reasonable to say that Congress
intended the act to be the exclusive means of production as of right. It
was Jencks that concerned Congress, not previous cases, and the thrust
of Jencks was thought to be the broadening of rules for production directly
to the defense, not of rules permitting a quite different class of Govern-
"ment documents to be produced under a quite different set of safeguards.
The act may be properly seen as the exclusive vehicle for production as of
right, but a vehicle which still permits documents outside subsection (e)
30 See note 24 supra.
3' 103 CONG. REc. 15931 (1957) (remarks of Senator Hruska).
32 Instant case at 349-50.
Id. at 352.
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to be produced under the pre-existing Goldman rule. Several circuit
courts prior to the instant case had in fact so construed its terms.3 4
Moreover, normative as well as historical considerations seem to dic-
tate an interpretation of the Jencks Act as not precluding the discretionary
production of documents not of the class therein described. Clearly there
are documents that are not "statements" of the witness, that may be
admissible in evidence to impeach the witness by showing bias. Where
the author of such a memorandum is not available and it constitutes the
only means of impeachment accessible to the defense, exclusiveness of the
act would work a severe hardship not necessitated by security needs or
intended by Congress. The instant decision has already been held to allow
a witness to use a memorandum to refresh his memory prior to trial with-
out subjecting it to production.8 5 Yet such is a situation in which produc-
tion seems clearly called for or, at the least, a situation whose resolution
should be within the discretion of the trial judge.3 6  An in camera
examination of papers sought to be produced would allow adequate judicial
consideration of all those factors which seem to disturb the majority of
the Court-risk to national security, potentially misrepresentative nature
of the memorandum-and the balancing of these considerations favoring
non-disclosure against the needs of the particular accused's defense within
the significant fact context of the individual case.3 7 It is precisely in such
an area, where the variety of situations is infinite and the real necessities
of particular cases unforseeable, that flexible rules are most desirable.
Such an approach would, in addition, minimize the importance of the
merely formal distinction between those documents which do qualify as a
subsection (e) "statement" 38 and those which do not, a distinction which,
itself depending upon a more or less mechanical test of paper form, be-
comes under the majority's reading of the statute, the single critical de-
terminant of whether or not a paper, however indifferent to governmental
security and however indispensable to the defense, becomes producible.
84 See, e.g., Lambert v. United States, 261 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1958); United
States v. Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1958). The courts in these cases found
that the documents were outside of either the statute or the Jencks rule and so denied
production under the applicable pre-Jencks cases.
35 McGill v. United States, No. 14,792, D.C. Cir., Aug. 20, 1959. Here notes
were used by a witness to refresh his recollection prior to coming to court. Produc-
tion was refused by the trial court and affirmed by the circuit court which cited
Palermo in support of the denial of production.
31 In fact the Government's attorney admitted that unusual circumstances might
call for exceptions in the act. 27 U.S.L. WEEK 3308 (U.S. May 5, 1959). Even
Mr. Hoover, Director of the F.B.I., although a staunch advocate of non-disclosure,
has not urged an exemption to production as broad as that which the instant majority's
exclusive interpretation would impute to the Jencks Act See Hoover, The Confi-
dential Nature of FBI Reports, 8 SYRAcusE L. Rxv. 1 (1956). The main motives
of secrecy advocated therein are the protection of confidential investigative techniques
and confidential informants.
87 See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). Although in a civil
case, the Courts balancing of interests, Government against individual, offers an
excellent example of a flexible and inoppressive solution to the problem in the form
of a calculus which appears duly sensitive to the evils feared by Congress.
8 See note 26 supra.
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That utilization of so inelastic and ritualistic a standard may make it pos-
sible for the F.B.I. and other federal agencies, by deleting just so much
of verbatim transcripts as will take them out of the technical definition
of a "statement," to develop a procedure for effective insulation against any
undesired disclosure is a hazard not to be ignored. And there appears also
a question whether, under the exclusive interpretation, the act does, not
come perilously close to the constitutional limitation upon abridgement of
an individual's rights of defense.3 9 It is to be hoped that in a case where
the problem definitively and ineluctably poses itself, the Court may rather
adopt the non-exclusive view of the act already expounded by four of its
Justices.
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES-AproniNAB. STOCK Dismamu-
TION ALLOCATES NUMBER OF SHARES REPRESENTING CAPITALIZED
EARNINGS ACCRUED SINCE SETTLING OF TRUST WITHOUT ADJTUST-
MENT FOR INFLATION
A testamentary trust was created in 1915, the trust property consisting
in part of 130 shares of General Electric common stock. In 1954 when,
after two four-for-one stock splits and a sale by the trustee of 1,080 shares,
the trust held 1,000 shares of General Electric stock, General Electric made
a three-for-one stock distribution in which 872 per cent of the new shares
were supported by a transfer from earned surplus to capital of earnings
which had accrued since the creation of the trust. The remaining 12Yz
per cent was supported by a change in the form of the existing capital
stock.' Ruling on the distribution of the newly created shares as between
life tenant and remainder interest, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
affirmed a decree awarding 1,750 shares, the whole number of shares
representing capitalized earnings accrued since the creation of the trust,
to the life tenant and retaining only 1,250 shares in the trust. In so hold-
ing, the court rejected the respective contentions of the appellant corporate
39 See the concurring opinion in the instant case at 362-63. See also Keeffe, links
and Jencks, 7 CATHOLIC U.L. Rrv. 91 (1958). The author discusses the constitutional
problems inherent in different constructions of the statute.
1 Prior to this stock distribution, General Electric common stock had no par
value but a stated value of $6.25 per share. The distribution effected a "change and
conversion" of the company's stock so that in exchange for each share of $6.25 stated
value stock the shareholder would receive three shares of $5.00 par value stock. Thus
the distribution was accomplished by a "write down" of the stated value of each
existing share from $6.25 to $5.00. This made $1.25 in capital available for the
support of the two new shares. The balance of the par value was supported by a
transfer of $8.75 from earned surplus to capital. See Cunningham Estate, 395 Pa.
1, 5, 149 A.2d 72, 75 (1959). The resolution of the General Electric shareholders
approving this distribution appears in In re Fosdicls Trust, 4 N.Y.2d 646, 152 N.E.2d
228, 176 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1958).
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trustee . first, that the distribution was not an apportionable dividend;
second, that if, however, an apportionment were to be made, the life tenant
-should-receive no more than that number of shares whose aggregate current
market value equaled the amount of earned surplus capitalized to support
'the new shares; and -third, alternatively, if the court chose to follow the
principle of looking to the book value of shares retained in the trust after
apportionment rather than to the market value of shares delivered free of
trust to the life tenant in determining the number of shares allocable to
income, that at least this process should be "refined" by translating the
original book value figure into comparable units of actual purchasing power
to more accurately reflect the economic realities of the prevailing infla-
tionary cycle.2 Mercantile Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. v. Apponyi, 152
A.2d 184 (Md. 1959). 3
American courts have formulated several rules for the allocation
between principal and income of proceeds received on stock held in trust.
4
The Massachusetts rule provides that cash dividends be given to the life
.tenant while all dividends in the form of stock are to be allocated to prin-
cipal.6 -This rule is followed in the Uniform Principal and Income Act 6
which was adopted by Maryland in 1939. 7 The provisions of the act, how-
2 This third argument of the trustee was urged as a means of compensating for
the effect of inflation on the principal of the trust. In this regard, the trustee sug-
gested that the intact value should be adjusted by means of the Wholesale Price
Index-All Commodities, 1947-1949 Base, Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States
Department of Labor.
3 This same General Electric stock distribution was the subject of controversy
:in Harvey Estate, 395 Pa. 62, 149 A.2d 104 (1959), and Cunningham Estate, 395
Pa. 1, 149 A.2d 72 (1959), where the court refused to make an apportionment.
Since the distribution was not supported entirely by a transfer of earned surplus to
capital, it was not a pure "stock dividend." Being supported in part by existing
capital, it had some of the elements of a "stock split." See 32 TEMP. L.Q. 368 (1959) ;
63 DICK. L. REv. 276 (1959). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, recognizing'public policy to be against apportionment, refused to extend the Pennsylvania rule to
cover this situation. This stock distribution was also the subject of controversy in
In re Fosdick's Trust, 4 N.Y.2d 646, 152 N.E.2d 228, 176 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1958),
where the court considered 7/ of the General Electric stock to be a "dividend"
and awarded that amount to the residuary legatee in accordance with the testator's
directions. In making an apportionment in the instant case, however, the Maryland
court felt itself controlled by its earlier decision in Donaldson v. Mercantile Safe-
Deposit & Trust Co., 214 Md. 421, 135 A.2d 433 (1957), where a similar stock
distribution by the Texas Company was the subject of controversy, and was therefore
unable to follow Harvey Estate, supra, and Cunningham Estate, supra. But it never-
theless seems curious that no mention of these two decisions was made by the court.
4 See generally 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 236.3 (2d ed. 1956); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d
1273 (1954). The Kentucky rule which allocates all proceeds received on stock held
in trust to the life tenant regardless of their form has been abandoned by Kentucky.
Bowles v. Stilley's Ex'r, 267 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1954).
5 Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101, 96 Am. Dec. 705 (1868). See generally 3 SCOTT,
TRUSTS § 236.3, at 1813 (2d ed. 1956).
SUNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 5. See Note, 32 CoLum. L. REV. 118
(1932). For the twenty-three states which have adopted the act see 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS
§ 241A (2d ed. 1956, Supp. 1959).
T MD. CoDE ANN. art. 75B, § 5 (1957). The Uniform Act was adopted by Penn-
sylvania in 1945 and re-enacted with slight revision in 1947. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§§ 3470.1-.15 (Supp. 1958).
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ever, are not retroactive, and common-law rules of apportionment apply
to all trusts created before 1939.8
Dating from Earp's Appeal 9 in 1857 and held since 1894 the con-
trolling common-law principle in Maryland,10 the Pennsylvania rule pro-
vides for an apportionment of stock proceeds between principal and income.
Under this rule it is the source of the distribution and not its form which
governs the allocation:" so much of a stock dividend as represents earn-
ings which have accrued since the creation of the trust is presumptively
income to the life tenant.'2 Application of the rule, however, is subject
to the limitation that the apportionment of new shares to the life tenant
must not impair the intact value of the shares held by the trust prior to the
'distribution of new stock by the corporation, intact value being the book
'value of the shares at the settling of the trust, and impairment being charged
in terms of current, post-distribution book value.' 3 Thus the market value
of the shares, whether at the time the trust was created or at the time
of distribution of new shares, is not a factor in the determination of intact
value or the number of shares to be assigned to the income interest.' 4
On the other hand, while it too apportions stock proceeds between the
life tenant and the remainderman, New Jersey rejects the Pennsylvania
principle of looking only to book value of the shares," and considers their
market value in determining the number to b6 allocated to the life tenant.,
As stated by the instant court,' the New Jersey rule provides "... that
8 Lindau v. Community Fund, 188 Md. 474, 53 A.2d 409 (1947). A similar result
was reached in Pennsylvania in Pew's Estate, 362 Pa. 468, 67 A.2d 129 (1949), and
Craviford's Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949), in which it was held that to
apply the act retroactively would be unconstitutional.
9 28 Pa. 368 (1857).
10 Thomas v. Gregg, 78 Md. 545, 28 AtI. 565 (1894).
"1 Donaldson v. Mercantile Safe-Deposit & Trust Co., 214 Md. 421, 428, 135 A.2d
433, 435 (1957): "'In considering this question, we are not to be governed by the
mere form in which the dividend has been declared. The origin and character of the
fund out of which the dividend is paid is the controlling subject of inquiry. If it is
found to represent earnings, it will be held to be income; but if it is an appropri-
ation of capital, it belongs to corpus."' (Emphasis added by court.)
2 E.g., Northern Cent. Dividend Cases, 126 Md. 16, 94 Atl. 338 (1915) ; Atlantic
Coast Line Dividend Cases, 102 Md. 73, 61 AtI. 295 (1905).
13 Lindau v. Community Fund, 188 Md. 474, 53 A.2d 409 (1947); Baldwin v.
Baldwin, 159 Md. 175, 150 Atl. 282 (1930). It is pointed out, however, in Lueders'
Estate, 337 Pa. 155, 10 A.2d 415 (1940), that intact value will be increased by capital
increases not attributable to earnings. See Harvey Estate, 395 Pa. 62, 149 A.2d 104
(1959).
14 Donaldson v. Mercantile Safe-Deposit & Trust Co., 214 Md. 421, 135 A.2d
433 (1957); Baldwin v. Baldwin, supra note 13; Northern Cent Dividend Cases,
126 Md. 16, 94 Atl. 338 (1915); Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 21 AtI. 438 (1891);
Moss's Appeal, 83 Pa. 264 (1877). But cf. Arrot Estate, 383 Pa. 228, 118 A2d
187 (1955), where the court held that the intact value of shares acquired by the
trustee after the death of the settlor should be their market value. Cf. Cunning-
ham Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 15, 149 A.2d 72, 80 (1959) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
15 E.g., In the Matter of Estate of Terhune, 50 N.J. Super. 414, 142 A.2d 684
(Super. Ct. 1958); Hagedorn v. Arens, 106 N.J. Eq. 377, 150 Atl. 4 (Ch. 1930);
Day v. Faulks, 79 N.J. Eq. 66, 81 Atl. 354 (Ch. 1911) ; Lang v. Lang's Ex'r, 57 N.J.
Eq. 326, 41 Atl. 705 (Ct. Err. & App. 1898).
1H Instant case at 185.
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the life tenant is limited to the dollar amount of earned surplus capitalized,
that is to say, entitled to the number of shares which, at fair market value,
equals the number of dollars transferred from earned surplus to capital." 17
Application of this method of apportionment in the present case would have
resulted in 225 as opposed to 1,750 shares being given to the life tenant.1 s
While this approach would greatly reduce the number of shares to be al-
located to the income interest in the frequent instance where the market
value of shares in an expanding corporation exceeds their book value, it is
a realistic approach because it provides the life tenant with the actual dollar
amount of earnings which the new shares represent. 19 Per contra, it is
said in support of the Pennsylvania rule that this latter most nearly follows
the intent of the settlor: since he has directed that the income received on
the property held in trust be paid to the life tenant, the life tenant should
be entitled to all the corporate earnings regardless of the form in which
they are distributed by the corporation.20 However, since questions of
this nature may never occur to the settlor, he generally fails to state his
intention. "Ordinarily, therefore, the question is not what he intended or
probably intended, but what he probably would have intended had he ever
considered the matter." 21
Evaluating the scheme of allocation approved in the instant case in
terms of such a hypothetical "settlor's intent" points out the startling
nature of its holding. At the settlor's death in 1915, the 130 shares of
General Electric stock had a market value of $21,000.00,22 and provided
the life tenant with income from cash dividends of $1,040.00 a year.2
After two four-for-one stock splits, the trustee in 1935 sold 1,080 shares
for $32,000.00,24 leaving 1,000 shares in the trust. In 1959, by the court's
apportionment, 1,250 shares worth $100,000.00 remained in the trust and
would continue to provide the life tenant with an income of $2,500.00 from
17 The new shares are allocated to principal subject to a charge in favor of the
life tenant for the amount of earnings per share transferred from earned surplus to
capital which they represent. Plainfield Trust Co. v. Bowlby, 107 N.J. Eq. 68, 151
At. 545 (Ch. 1930).
18 Since only $8.75 was transferred from earned surplus to capital to support the
new shares and there were, prior to the distribution, 1,000 shares in the trust, the life
tenant under the New Jersey rule would be entitled to $8,750.00. The market price
of General Electric stock after the distribution was 38?A. At this price, 225 shares
would provide the life tenant with the cash amount to which he would be entitled.
See Brief for Appellants Burke and Lombardi, Guardian Ad Litem, pp. 15-16, instant
case; MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2343 (1958).
19 The Court of Appeals of Maryland in declining to adopt this method of ap-
portionment was consistent with its earlier decision in Northern Cent. Dividend
Cases, 126 Md. 16, 94 Atl. 338 (1915).
2 0 E.g., Waterman's Estate, 279 Pa. 491, 124 Atl. 166 (1924). See generally
Annot., 130 A.L.R. 486, 511 (1941). Of course where the settlor spells out his intent
as to allocation of distributions in the form of stock, there is no problem, and his
directions will be followed. Ferguson Trust, 354 Pa. 367, 47 A.2d 245 (1946).
213 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 236.12 (2d ed. 1956).
2 2 Instant case at 188.
23 In 1915, General Electric paid a cash dividend of $8.00 per share. MooDy's
INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2343 (1958).
24 Instant case at 190.
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cash dividends. But in addition the life tenant acquired free of the trust
1,750 shares, sufficient to earn cash dividends amounting to $3,500.00 a year
and with an immediate market value of $140,000.00. Thus the practical
result of the court's decision has been to deliver absolutely to the life
tenant a number of shares which can be readily sold for an amount far in
excess of the capitalized earnings which they represent; and this accrual
of the excess of market value over proportionate net worth to the exclusive
benefit of the income beneficiary substantially reverses the original relative
positions of life tenant and remainderman. The detriment thus suffered
by the remainder interest becomes especially apparent when it is noted that
if the -trustee had sold the 1,000 shares of General Electric stock in 1954
prior to the three-for-one stock distribution, he could have received as
much as $124,000.00 2 6 and this amount would have been considered a
capital gain properly allocated in its entirety to principal.2 7 Moreover,
the apportionment to the life tenant of 1,750 of the new shares reduces by
more than one-half the voting power in General Electric which the trustee
had prior to the three-for-one stock distribution. Admittedly, with large
corporations such as General Electric, the settlor would probably have little
or no concern over the diminution of voting power in the corporation.
But where small, closely held corporations are concerned reduction or loss
of corporate control by apportionment would in many instances be con-
trary to the settlor's probable intent 28
The use of the book value of stock in determining intact value and
thereby limiting the number of shares apportionable to the life tenant has
also been supported by the theory that book value represents the actual
value of shares held in the trust. It is said that the use of market value
as a standard would subject the rights of life tenant and remainderman to
the "shifting sands of the stock market." 2 9 If stock certificates held by the
trust are considered to represent a fixed portion of the value of a corpora-
tion's assets on a certain date, this reasoning is valid. To the contrary,
however, both life tenant and remainderman might well be expected rather
to consider the stock certificates held in the trust to represent a propor-
tionate interest in a corporation whose assets constantly increase or
25 The market value of General Electric common stock has varied between 74.S
and 84-4, and it presently pays an annual cash dividend of $2.00 per share. Wall
Street J., Sept. 1, 1959, p. 24, col. 2. For this discussion, a figure of $80.00 per share
was employed.
26 In 1954, prior to the distribution of new stock, the market price of General
Electric common stock varied between 87 and 124%. MooDY's INDUSTRIAL MANUAL
2345 (1958).
27 Girdwood v. Safe-Deposit & Trust Co., 143 Md. 245, 122 Atl. 132 (1923);
Ex Parte Humbird, 114 Md. 627, 80 Atl. 209 (1911) ; Smith v. Hooper, 95 Md. 16,
54 Atl. 95 (1902). Contra, Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 AtI. 200 (1927),
where the court held that so much of the proceeds from a sale of stock as represents
accrued earnings is apportionable to the life tenant.
28 Cf. Steele's Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 103 A.2d 409 (1954), where the appor-
tionment of a 25% stock dividend reduced the voting strength of the trustee from
49% to 39%.
29 Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 21 Atl. 438 (1891).
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diminish in value.80 Also, it is not unlikely that both parties would tend to.
regard the value of the shares held in the trust in terms of their market
price, which often has little correlation to book value.31
In fact, in the century since the formation of the Pennsylvania rule,.
there have occurred changes in corporate dividend policy and in-the.
economy which tend to make its strict application unrealistic. The ratioziile,
of Earp's Appeal-that accumulated profits were to be deemed "income",
within the meaning of the will 3 2-has largely been undercut by present*
day corporate practice, under which large stock distributions similar to -the
one made by General Electric are designed not so much to distribute earn-
ings as they are to make the stock more attractive to investors by lowering
its market price and to enable the corporation to utilize its cash for expan-
sion and reinvestment programs. 33 Once committed to corporate expan-
sion- and reinvestment programs, these profits from a practical viewpoint
can no longer be considered available for distribution. Further, since a.
shareholder has no vested interest in the company's accumulated profits
but depends for dividends on an exercise of honest discretion by the di-
rectors,34 doubt may in any event be cast on the appropriateness of con-
sidering retained earnings as the "income" of particular stockholders. But
a still more significant argument in confutation of the logic of Earp's
Appeal emerges from a comparison of the results achieved under the Penn-
sylvania and New Jersey rules. For the added sums of money which fall
to the life tenant when the former rather than the latter rule is invoked
as a principle of apportionment are not the surplus earnings of the cor-
poration-not even surplus earnings retained and reinvested-but represent
rather the excess of market price per share over each share's proportionate
stake in those capitalized earnings: a figure indicating not what profits
the corporation has in fact realized on the funds invested but what the
investment community is currently willing to pay for its stock.35 To
envisage such sums as "income" within the hypothetical understanding of
the settlor seems more than slightly strained. And in the same vein
it should be noted that for federal income tax purposes, the United States
Supreme Court in Eisner v. Macomber 36 held that distributions of this
nature do not constitute income. Consequently, the life tenant in the present
case has received as "income" 1,750 shares of stock free from any federal
income tax.37
30 See generally Isaacs, Principat--Quantum or Res?, 46 HARv. L. REV. 776
(1933).
31 CLENDENIN, INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENTS 84 (1955). See also Cunningham
Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 48, 149 A.2d 72, 95 (1959) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
32 28 Pa. at 374.
33 See generally Barker, Evaluation of Stock Dividends, 36 HARv. Bus. REV. 99
(1958) ; Zang & Thompson, Why Stock Dividends Are Declared, 27 TAXES 883 (1949).
3 4 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 231 (Rev. ed. 1946).
35 Compare the rule of the cases cited in note 13 supra.
36252 U.S. 189 (1919).
37 See Cohan & Dean, Legal, Tax and Accounting Aspects of Fiduciary Appor-"
tionment of Stock Proceeds: The Non-Statutory Pennsylvania Rules, 106 U. PA. L.
REv. 157, 192-99 (1957).
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- Inflation was of course a well known economic fact in 1915 when the
trust in the present case was created. Historically, however, the continued
rise of prices and consequent decline of dollar purchasing power during,
peacetime is a phenomenon of the post World War II years.38  Also, the
inflationary spiral since 1939 has been more accentuated and prolonged
than any other in American history. 9 This continued presence of infla-
tion would seem to demand development of a distribution scheme allowing
both life tenant and remainderman to participate in the results of -an ex-
panding economy and compensating for the impact of inflation on the
principal of the trust.
40
Awareness of these new economic conditions appears to have -pro-
vided some of the reason for the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
having adopted the Massachusetts rule in the Uniform Principal and In-:
come Act.41  Similarly, even the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
recognized that public policy as expressed by that state's adoption of the
Uniform Act is currently opposed to the Pennsylvania rule, and has, in
Cunningham Estate, taken a severely restrictive view of what it will
consider an apportionable distribution.42  In another analogous ap-
proach intended to achieve a more realistic result under present day cir-
cumstances, it has been suggested that the corporate purpose underlying
the stock distribution be examined to determine the true nature of the
transaction. If the purpose is essentially that of a "stock split," no appor-
tionment should be made; nor would any share distribution be considered
an apportionable "stock dividend" unless it was so small that it would not
seriously depress the market price and unless the new shares were capi-
talized from earned surplus at approximately the current market price
per share, as required by the New York Stock Exchange.43  Thus, only
small stock distributions issued to enable the corporation to retain earn-
ings and which have little effect on market price of shares remaining in
the trust would be apportionable as "stock dividends." A ruling adopting
this suggestion would in the present case-similarly to the operation of
the Uniform Principal and Income Act, had it been applicable, or to the
rule of Cunningham Estate-have caused all the newly created shares to
be allocated to principal. Likewise, because it limits the life tenant to the
actual cash amount of capitalized earnings which a stock distribution
represents, the New Jersey method of apportionment would appear a more
realistic modern approach than the Pennsylvania rule.
44
3 8 GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SocIETY 210 (1958).
39 See generally MOULTON, CAN INFLATION BE CONTROLLED? (1958).40 See Cohan & Dean, supra note 37, at 205.
4 1 See Prefatory Note to Act. Perhaps the primary motive was convenience in
trust administration.
42 See note 3 supra.
43 In re Fosdick's Trust, 4 N.Y.2d 646, 656, 152 N.E.2d 228, 234, 176 N.Y.S.2d
966, 973 (1958) (dissenting opinion). See also, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 878 (1957); 57
MicH. L. Rxv. 787 (1959).
44 See text accompanying notes 17 and 18 supra. It would seem that the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has realized the significance of market value in some situations
1959]
154 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.108
But despite these numerous factors which would justify a reappraisal
of the Pennsylvania rule, the book value principle has been continually
defended on the theory that it imparts a standard of certainty to problems
of apportionment, 45 and it is unlikely that courts which have become
committed to the use of book value would now consider a departure from
this standard. Accordingly, the trustee in the instant case argued that,
if a book value test were to be used, original book value should be adjusted
in terms of its present day purchasing power by use of a price index.
4 6
The adoption of such a procedure, while not calling for reversal of the
Pennsylvania rule, would correct to a very large extent the inequities in-
herent in that rule when inflation, depreciating the actual purchasing value
of the corpus, operates to the detriment of the remainderman. Applying
the formula argued for by the trustee,47 the 1915 book value of $8,575.97
(taking consideration of the sale of 1,080 shares in 1935) would be ad-
justed in terms of 1954 dollars to $19,335.80 by means of the price index.
The 1954 dollar book value of the principal after apportioning 1,750
shares to the life tenant would be $11,650.10; and thus, while no impair-
ment of the original unadjusted book value appears, subtracting the 1954
book value of $11,650.10 from the adjusted 1915 book value of $19,335.80
reveals an impairment of $7,685.70 which the trustee would restore to the
trust by withholding from the life tenant 874 48 of the otherwise appor-
tionable 1,750 shares. Such use of the price index to determine an adjusted
intact value would, at the small cost of imposing a relatively simple step
on the already complicated process of apportionment, serve to protect the
principal of the trust from the impact of inflation.49  And had the court
in the present case applied this formula, the life tenant would still have
received shares which, at their market value, could have provided a cash
amount far in excess of the earnings per share capitalization which the
1,750 shares represented.
In short, some limitation on the Pennsylvania rule should be applied
to compensate in part for changes in corporate policy and the economy.
In view of the widespread practice of companies to distribute stock divi-
dends, it can be expected that apportionment problems will continue to
in determining intact value. In Harvey Estate, 395 Pa. 62, 149 A.2d 104 (1959),
the court accounted for the unrealized appreciation in value of securities held by the
Insurance Company of North America in its investment portfolio. See also Cohan,
Observations on Cunningham and Harvey: Apportionments Revisited, 140 LEG. IN-
TELLIGENCER (Philadelphia) 109, 120 (1959).
45 Cunningham Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 60, 149 A.2d 72, 103 (1959) (concurring and
dissenting opinion).
46 See text accompanying note 2 supra.
47 Instant case at 188; Brief for Appellant Mercantile Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
pp. 11-13, instant case.
48 Instant case at 188. Withholding 874 shares at their book value of $8.80 per
share would restore the impairment of the adjusted book value.
49 For a discussion of the relative responsiveness of various statistical indexes
to economic factors, see generally MOULTON, CAN INFLATION BE CONTROLLED? (1958).
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arise.50 The argument made by the trustee in the present case offers
a reasonable solution to the problems of fulfilling the settlor's intent, com-
pensates for inflation and coincides with more recent views on the nature
of corporate stock distributions. 51
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-CONTRACTOR HELD NOT IM-
MUNE FRoM COMMoN-LAw NEGLIGENCE ACTION BY INJURED EM-
PLOYEE OF SUBCONTRACTOR WHERE BOTH HE AND SUBCONTRACTOR
CARRIED WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE ON INJURED EM-
PLOYEE
Plaintiff, the employee of a subcontractor, was injured while working
on a construction project. Though his immediate employer had secured
workmen's compensation insurance, the injured employee chose to reject
the compensation to which he was entitled under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,' adopted as the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act for the District of Columbia,2 and instead brought an action
for damages for personal injuries 3 against the general contractor, alleging
that the contractor had been negligent in failing to provide a safe place
to work. Defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that inas-
much as he, as well as the subcontractor, carried workmen's compensation
insurance on the subcontractor's employees, he was relieved under section
905 of the act of all other liability for the injuries of those employees. 4 The
-50 The number of stock dividends issued by corporations listed on the New York
Stock Exchange was 143 in 1955, 197 in 1956 and 177 in 1957. Barker, mtpra
note 33, at 99.
1 It would seem that the use of this procedure is possible in Pennsylvania. In
its determination of present book value the court in Harvey Estate, 395 Pa.
62, 149 A.2d 104 (1959), took into account unrealized appreciation in worth of the
securities held by the Insurance Company of North America in its investment port-
folio. It was willing to do so because the appreciated value of these assets on the
date of the apportionable event could be easily ascertained, as contrasted to the situa-
tion of assets such as land where the increased value would have to be determined
by opinion evidence. But just as security prices on a given date are easily ascer-
tained, the contemporary increment or detriment of dollar purchasing power is by
means of a price index accurately and readily appraised. If the Pennsylvania courts
are willing to make the kind of factual economic re-evaluation made in Harvey,
similarly adjusting original book value in terms of current purchasing power would
appear to be a logical step in the process of achieving a realistic and sensitive measure
of the intact value of securities, especially inasmuch as the rise in security prices and
the decline in dollar value are both concomitant-in fact mutually offsetting-results,
in part, of the same factors of inflation and expanding economy.
144 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§901-50 (1952), as amended
33 U.S.C. §§ 906-44 (Supp. V, 1958).
2 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 501-02 (1951).
3 Pursuant to 44 Stat. 1440 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1952).
4 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §905 (1952). The pertinent portion of the
statute provides that "the [workmen's compensation] liability of an employer pre-
scribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability
of such employer to the employee. .... "
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district court held that, under the applicable provisions of the act,5 the
general contractor is required to carry insurance only if the subcontractor
fails to do so and, where the subcontractor does carry insurance, the gen-
eral contractor is not released from common-law liability merely because
he "voluntarily" carries insurance which the law does not obligate him to
take out. Thomas v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 173 F. Supp. 381
(D.D.C. 1959).
Section 904 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act provides that "in the case of an employer who is a subcontractor,
the contractor shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of such
[workmen's] compensation to employees of the subcontractor unless the
subcontractor has secured such payment." 6 Forty-two states 7 now have
analogous "statutory employer" or "contractor-under" statutes, providing
that in certain cases the general, or principal, contractor will be regarded
as the employer of his subcontractor's employees for the purposes of
workmen's compensation laws. These "statutory employer" laws have
generally been construed as immunizing the general contractor from com-
mon-law negligence suit by an employee of his subcontractor where he
actually pays workmen's compensation benefits or is primarily liable for
the payment of such benefits to the employees of his subcontractor.8
Several jurisdictions have extended the contractor's immunity from neg-
ligence actions to cover all compensable on-the-job injuries sustained by
employees of the subcontractor, even where the subcontractor has taken
out insurance and is liable for compensation benefits to his employees. 9
But where one or more facts which the "statutory employer" law makes
necessary to the contractor's liability for workmen's compensation are
missing, a majority of courts have ruled that, vis-a-vis a subcontractor's
employee, the general contractor is a third party not covered by the
.544 Stat 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§904-05 (1952).
044 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §904 (1952).
7 Alaska, California, Delaware, Iowa, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode
Island and West Virginia have no "statutory employer" laws. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 72.31, at 175 n.22 (1952) ; 2 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 326, at 176 n.3 (perm. ed. 1942).
8 See, e.g., Gifford v. Nottingham, 68 Idaho 330, 193 P.2d 831 (1948) ; McEvilly
v. L. E. Myers Co., 211 Ky. 31, 276 S.W. 1068 (1925); Mosley v. Jones, 224 Miss.
725, 80 So. 2d 819 (1955); Jordon v. Champlin Ref. Co., 200 Okla. 604, 198 P.2d
408 (1948). But see Sweezey v. Arc Elec. Constr. Co., 295 N.Y. 306, 67 N.E.2d
369 (1946), where the New York court held that, even though the general contractor
was obligated to pay compensation, the common-law negligence action of a sub-
contractor's employee was maintainable inasmuch as the contractor was only con-
ditionally liable, i.e., not bound to secure compensation as an employer but rather
obligated to pay compensation only if the subcontractor did not secure it.
9 See Miami Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Kindt, 48 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1950);
Bindbeutel v. L. D. Willcutt & Sons Co., 244 Mass. 195, 138 N.E. 239 (1923);
Swartz v. Conradis, 298 Pa. 343, 148 Atl. 529 (1929). See also Girardi v. Penn-
sylvania Power & Light Co., 174 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Pa. 1959), where the court held
that a mere retention of a right of control, in the absence of actual control, in the
case of a primary contractor satisfies the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation
Act requirements for liability under the act and that therefore the injured employee
of a subcontractor could not maintain a common-law negligence action against
the contractor.
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exclusive liability provisions of the workmen's compensation acts and as
such is not immune from suits for damages for personal injuries by em-
ployees of his subcontractors. Thus, in jurisdictions where, as in the
instant case, the contractor is liable for the payment of workmen's com-
pensation only where the subcontractor is uninsured,' ° it has been held
that the contractor is suable at common law where compensation insurance
has been taken out by the subcontractor.-" Under statutes making the
contractor liable for compensation where he has sublet work which is a
part of his trade or business,1 2 it is generally held that immunity from
suits at common law does not exist where the subcontracted work is out-
side the scope of the principal's occupation.' Cases holding the contractor
not immune from common-law liability for negligence where some fact
necessary to his liability for compensation is missing generally reason that
the workmen's compensation acts are controlling only where an employer-
employee relationship exists; 14 that, as between the principal contractor
and the employees of his subcontractors, the legislature intended to create
this relationship only where a subcontractor failed to carry insurance,15
or where a principal sublet work which was a part of his occupation; 16
that the purpose of the "statutory employer" laws is to protect the right
of the subcontractor's employees to receive compensation for all work-
connected injuries regardless of fault and to deter principal contractors
from destroying that right by subletting work to financially irresponsible
or uninsured subcontractors; "' that, inasmuch as the reason for the
statute has ceased to exist where the subcontractor is insured, the con-
tractor's liability for compensation also ceases; and that, where the con-
tractor is not liable for compensation, the statute accords him no immunity
from common-law liability and the employee's common-law rights against
the contractor remain unimpaired.' 8
The holding of the instant case, that the contractor is not immune
from a common-law action for negligence where both he and the sub-
contractor have secured workmen's compensation insurance on the latter's
10 Aiu. STAT. ANN. § 81-1306 (Supp. 1957); N.J. REv. STAT. § 34:15-79 (1937);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.06 (1957).
1Baldwin Co. v. Maner, 224 Ark. 348, 273 S.W.2d 28 (1954); Corbett v.
Starrett Bros., 105 N.J.L. 228, 143 Atl. 352 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928); Culbertson v.
Kieckhefer Container Co., 197 Wis. 349, 222 N.W. 249 (1928).
12 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 31-154 (1958); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.040 (1952); VA.
CODE ANN. § 65-27 (1950).
13 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wallace, 172 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1949) (applying
Virginia law); Battistelli v. Connohio, Inc., 138 Conn. 646, 88 A.2d 372 (1952);
Settle v. Baldwin, 355 Mo. 336, 196 S.W.2d 299 (1946) ; Kramer v. Kramer, 199 Va.
409, 100 S.E.2d 37 (1957).
34 Corbett v. Starrett Bros., 105 N.J.L. 228, 143 Atl. 352 (Ct. Err. & App.
1928).
15 Baldwin Co. v. Maner, 224 Ark. 348, 273 S.W.2d 28 (1954); Trumbull Cliffs
Furnace Co. v. Shachovsky, 111 Ohio St. 791, 146 N.E. 306 (1924).
16 Kramer v. Kramer, 199 Va. 409, 100 S.E.2d 37 (1957).
17 Marcbanks v. Duke Power Co., 190 S.C. 336, 2 S.E.Zd 825 (1939).
18 See generally Note, 37 MINN. L. Rv. 368 (1953); Note, 39 VA. L. REv.
951, 958-60 (1953).
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employees, was reasoned on two grounds. First, with regard to defendant's
argument that the duties and responsibilities imposed by the statute upon
the general contractor require as a quid pro quo immunity from suit at
common law,19 the court answered that the contractor has given no quid
pro quo in exchange for common-law immunity: that inasmuch as the
injured employee cannot receive double compensation, he was not benefited
by the fact that two persons carried workmen's compensation insurance
for his benefit. 20  In this answer, the court appears to have misconceived
both the elements of the quid pro quo which does exist under the District
of Columbia statute and defendant's argument relative to those elements.
The general contractor did not argue, as the court's opinion seems to in-
dicate, that the additional insurance voluntarily carried by him was a satis-
factory exchange for immunity at common law; indeed, it is readily ap-
parent that the employee receives no benefit from double insurance but
single compensation. The duplication of insurance, however, is not the
exchange contemplated by the statute; the real benefit to the employee
is the contractor's guarantee of compensation for all compensable, work-
connected injuries regardless of fault. Under the statutory system, the
contractor is given the alternative of either securing insurance on the
employees of uninsured subcontractors or hiring insured subcontractors
at a higher price to cover the added operational cost of insuring their
own employees. The employee thus receives the contractor's guarantee
that his injuries will be compensated either by the contractor or the sub-
contractor; in exchange, the contractor as well as the subcontractor should
receive immunity from common-law negligence actions brought by the
recipients of such guarantees.
2 1
With regard to the second ground on which the instant decision was
based, the court, pointing out that the language of the "subcontractor
clause" of the District of Columbia requires the contractor to carry insur-
ance only if the subcontractor fails to do so,22 reasoned that the statute
neither imposed an obligation on the contractor to take out insurance in
the instant situation nor accorded him common-law immunity if he volun-
19 Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
pp. 2-3.
20 Instant case at 383.
21 See also Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 914 (1957), where the court emphasizes the exclusiveness of the workmen's
compensation remedy, stating: "The history of the development of statutes, such as
this, creating a compensable right independent of the employer's negligence and not-
withstanding an employee's contributory negligence, recalls that the keystone is the
exclusiveness of the remedy. This concept emerged from a balancing of the sacrifices
and gains of both employees and employers, in which the former relinquished what-
ever rights they had at common law in exchange for a sure recovery under the
compensation statutes, while the employers on their part, in accepting a definite and
exclusive liability, assumed an added cost of operation which in time could be
actuarially measured and accurately predicted. .. ."
2244 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 904 (1952). The court emphasizes the excep-
tion contained in the last clause of the section, i.e., "unless the subcontractor has
secured such payment."
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tarily did so.23  In this reasoning the court seems to regard as obvious a
point which Congress in passing the workmen's compensation law did not
consider-that release from common-law liability is a benefit accruing
only to those carrying insurance as required by statute.24 The instant
law, as well as the several state statutes similar to it, is silent on whether
the legislature intended that the general contractor should remain a third
party suable at common law except where he was required to carry insur-
ance, or whether, in view of the close relationship between contractor
and subcontractor and the usual daily associations of their employees on the
job, it was intended to include the contractor within the subcontractor
employer's immunity. 25 The major premise of the court's reasoning,
therefore, is one which the language of the statute neither supports nor con-




Most "statutory employer" laws, 27 including that of the District of
Columbia, 2 8 by implication place upon the principal employer the duty of
hiring insured subcontractors and by express statement make him liable
for the payment of compensation to employees of an uninsured subcon-
tractor when he fails to fulfill that duty. In other words, the sanction
for failing to hire insured subcontractors is liability under the workmen's
23 The decision thus follows the majority of courts in ruling that, under statutes
similar to that of the District of Columbia, the contractor's liability is only secondary
and he therefore loses his immunity when the subcontractor insures. See note 11
ipra.
24 Instant case at 383.
25 On the facts of the instant case it would have been possible for the defendant
to argue that the legislature intended a third possibly alternative result, i.e., that the
effect of the statute is to immunize the general contractor from suit at common law
where he carries insurance on the subcontractor's employees, regardless of whether
the subcontractor carries such insurance. The weakness of this argument, as the
court stated in its opinion, is that inasmuch as the employee receives no benefit
through being doubly insured, the contractor would be accorded an unwarranted
immunity. The argument's lack of effectiveness is demonstrated by the fact that
defendant did not even mention it in his brief, preferring instead to rely on the
contention that the quid pro quo created by the statute-the contractor's guarantee
of compensation in exchange for common-law immunity-relieved the contractor of
liability at common law.
2 6 "[F]or the most part, state legislation neither expressly prohibits nor reserves
common-law actions against . .. some other employer whose negligent employee
is working on the same job with the injured plaintiff. Consequently very delicate
problems in statutory interpretation have devolved upon the courts. Frequently, the
courts have been forced to base their decisions on what they conceive to be the
legislative intent. Quite naturally a certain amount of judicial legislation has re-
sulted." Note, 39 VA. L. REv. 951, 952-53 (1953).
2 7 E.g., Aiu. STAT. ANN. § 81-1306 (Supp. 1957) ("Where a subcontractor fails
to secure compensation required by this Act, the prime contractor shall be liable for
compensation to the employees of the subcontractor. . . .") ; MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 176.215 (Supp. 1958) ("Where a subcontractor fails to comply with this chapter,
the general contractor . . . shall be liable for payment of all compensation due an
employee of a subsequent contractor who is engaged in work upon the subject matter
of the contract") ; N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:15-79 (1937) ("Any contractor placing work
with a subcontractor shall, in the event of the subcontractor's failing to carry work-
men's compensation as required by this article, become liable for any compensation
which may be due an employee . . . of the subcontractor.").
2844 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §904 (1952).
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compensation laws. However, where it is held that the contractor loses
his common-law immunity when he hires insured subcontractors, he is
in effect penalized for fulfilling the statutory duty by being exposed to
large personal injury judgments in common-law negligence actions. The
justification for the sanction in the first instance is as obvious as the
inequity of the "penalty" in the second. Having placed the responsibility
of securing insured subcontractors on the contractor, the District of
Columbia-type statute as construed by the court would require no surrender
of right by the employee in return. 29 Nor does it appear that the purpose
of the "statutory employer" laws is furthered by holding the contractor
liable at common law where the subcontractor has secured workmen's
compensation insurance on his employees. As previously stated, the pur-
pose of those laws is to protect employees of subcontractors where the
latter are not financially responsible or not insured"0 and to give the
general contractor an incentive to require subcontractors to carry insur-
ance.3 1 This purpose is certainly not advanced and may be retarded by
decisions analogous to that in the instant case. The legislature having
provided that the principal employer shall be liable for compensation where
he sublets work to uninsured subcontractors, the court now rules that the
same principal employer shall be liable at common law where he hires
insured subcontractors.3 2 The contractor is left not with an incentive
for providing compensation through subcontractors but with a choice of
2 9 In some jurisdictions, the legislature has avoided this apparent inequity by
placing primary liability for compensation on the general contractor and extending the
employer's release from common-law liability to include the contractor. See, e.g.,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 52 (1952) ("An employer who permits the entry upon
premises occupied by him or under his control of a laborer or an assistant hired by
an employee or contractor, for the performance upon such premises of a part of the
employer's regular business entrusted to such employee or contractor, shall be liable
to such laborer or assistant in the same manner and to the same extent as to his
own employee."). See note 9 supra. In other jurisdictions where the legislative
intent is less clear or entirely unclear the courts themselves have avoided the inequity
by construing the statute so as to accord the contractor immunity from suit at
common law. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.10 (1952) ("In case a contractor
sub-lets any part or parts of his contract work to a subcontractor, . . . all employees
of such contractor and subcontractor . . . shall be deemed to be employed in one
and the same business or establishment, and the contractor shall be liable for and
shall secure the payment of compensation to all such employees, except to employees
of a subcontractor who has secured such payment."). In construing the Florida
statute, the court held "that a contractor is liable for and shall secure compensation
to the employees of his subcontractors, even though such subcontractors have the
status of independent contractors, and that if such contractor has, in fact, secured
such compensation, either directly or indirectly through the subcontractor, the remedy
under the [Workmen's Compensation] Act is exclusive." Miami Roofing & Sheet
Metal Co. v. Kindt, 48 So. 2d 840, 843 (Fla. 1950).
3 0 Halpin v. Industrial Comm'n, 319 Ill. 130, 149 N.E. 764 (1925).
312 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 7, § 72.31.
82 In Miller v. J. A. Utley Constr. Co., 154 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Mich. 1957), the
court, construing a statute similar to that in the instant case and arriving at a similar
result noted, however, at 140, that "it seems paradoxical, while a general contractor
carries the risk of personal injury judgments in common-law actions by hiring sub-
contractors who are covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act, he is only held
to the limited employer's liabilities under the Act if he lets his work to subcontractors
who do not comply with, or who are not covered by, the Act."
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evils between liability for compensation or for common-law damages. Such
a situation is quite likely to discourage, rather than to encourage, the
letting of work to insured subcontractors.33
In addition to being at odds with the purpose of the "statutory
employer" laws, the instant decision does not appear to be in accord with
the goals of the workmen's compensation acts in general. Those goals
are, primarily, to provide prompt and reasonable compensation to all
employees disabled through work-connected accidents, regardless of fault,
and to spread the cost of such compensation over as broad a base as
possible, and, secondarily, to provide for employers a definite, limited, and
readily insurable liability with regard to industrial injuries.3 4 Where com-
mon-law suits against contractors are permitted, money which could be
more profitably applied toward raising compensation benefits to a reason-
ably adequate level is diverted into the costs of litigation.35 In third party
actions similar to the instant case, the principal employer's liability is not
a definite, insurable cost of doing business but rather a speculative risk
of litigation. Furthermore, to allow the injured employee of a subcon-
tractor to sue the general contractor at common law may result in greater
compensation for one employee than for another with an identical injury,
the increased recovery not being based on a more severe injury or greater
loss of earning capacity but being available merely because of the fortuitous
circumstance that one employee was working for a subcontractor while the
other was not 36 or that the employer of an injured workman who had
accepted compensation chose to exercise the right to recover damages
332 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 7, § 72.31. Commenting on rulings holding the
contractor not immune from suit at common law, Larson points out that "a sounder
result would seem to be a holding that the over-all responsibility of the general
contractor for getting sub-contractors insured, and his latent liability for compen-
sation if he does not, should be sufficient to remove him from the category of
'third party.'"
34 "[T]he purpose of that Act, as of the workmen's compensation acts of most
other States, is to provide . . . not only for employees a remedy which is both
expeditious and independent of proof of fault, but also for employers a liability
which is limited and determinate." Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145,
159 (1932) (interpreting Vermont law). See 1 L.,soN, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 1-3;
1 SCHxEmrER, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 1-10.
85 It is generally agreed that present benefit levels under workmen's compensation
statutes are insufficient. See, e.g., Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Corpensation
for Industrial Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 531, 555-57 (1954).
While raising the level of compensation benefits to an adequate level would of course
raise the cost of compensation to employers, it should be noted that the total estimated
cost of workmen's compensation to employers, as per cent of covered payroll, varied
between .89 and .98 in the years between 1946 and 1956. Skolnik, Trends in Work-
men's Compensation: Coverage, Benefits, and Costs, Social Security Bull., Aug.
1958, p. 15.
a 363 The workmen's compensation statute "was not intended to give the employees
of a subcontractor a benefit in the way of additional remedy, which the employees of
the general contractor did not have, but that the same compensation should be paid
to each, measured by earning capacity and the extent of the injury. Nor was it
intended that the employees of the subcontractor who was a subscriber under the act
should have an advantage over the employees of a subcontractor who was not a
subscriber." Bindbeutel v. L. D. Willcutt & Sons Co., 244 Mass. 195, 199, 138
N.E. 239, 240 (1923).
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assigned to him by operation of that acceptance." These considerations
lead to the conclusion that an unfortunate result is achieved by allowing
common-law actions against the contractor by employees of the sub-
contractor.
Much of what has been said with regard to the common-law liability
of contractors to employees of subcontractors is equally applicable to all
"third party" litigation in the work injury field.38 The basic purpose of
the insurance system being to compensate all employees for all on-the-job
injuries at an adequate rate, any retention of tort litigation and liability
in the industrial accident field seems undesirable. Tort liability as an
alternative to workmen's compensation 3 9 exposes the employee to the
possibility of receiving no compensation whatsoever if he loses his case
and, even if he wins, compensation much delayed.40  Rather than pre-
serving remnants of tort liability, the workmen's compensation system
should strive to provide speedy and sufficient compensation for all em-
ployees, the amount of such compensation being based solely on the
severity of the injury and the loss of earning capacity. Matters of adjust-
ment and indemnity between the employer or his insurer and third per-
sons at fault for on-the-job injuries should be left for settlement by nego-
tiation or litigation between those parties 41 after the employee, who is,
3744 Stat. 1440 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §933 (1952). This section of
the act provides that the employee's acceptance of compensation operates as an assign-
ment to his employer of all right of the employee to recover damages against a
possibly liable third person. If the employer presses and recovers on the claim, he
retains an amount equal to that which he has paid as compensation plus his expenses
in bringing suit and pays any excess to the injured employee. See note 41 infra,
remarking on the potential inequalities inherent in such a scheme.
3 8 In contrast with the American system, workmen's compensation in Great
Britain is not regarded as the injured employee's exclusive remedy. The employee
may, in addition to receiving compensation, bring a common-law negligence action
against his employer, and any recovery in such an action is reduced by one-half
the value of any compensation to which he may be entitled for five years after
the injury. Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 41. This
additional remedy may be justified, however, by the fact that workmen's compen-
sation in Britain is a plan to which the employee contributes, whereas in the United
States the system is employer-financed. National Insurance (Industrial Injuries)
Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 62, § 2. See generally Frank, Employers' Liability in
Great Britain, 18 LAw & CoNTrEmp. PRoa. 320 (1953) ; Somers & Somers, The British
Industrial Injuries Insurance System, 77 MONTHLY LABOR REv. 511 (1954).
1 39 Under the District of Columbia statute, the employee must elect to receive
compensation or to seek damages against a possibly liable third person. 44 Stat. 1440
(1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1952).
40 "Tort liability laws . . . have serious defects. Large awards are indeed won,
but only in relatively few cases that tend to be well publicized. When all cases are
studied, it is clear that only a small number of claims actually reach the courts, and
not all of these win large awards. The great majority are settled out of court by
individual bargaining between the employee and the employer's claim department-
an unsupervised contest between unequal parties. Most employees receive inadequate
amounts, and where the sole remedy is negligence litigation, a considerable number
receive nothing. . . . [The employee] would be exposed to the uncertainties and
denials which led to a general abandonment of tort liability compensation." Pollack,
A Policy Decision for Workmen's Compensation, 7 IND. & LAB. REt.. Rxv. 51, 60-61
(1953).
41 For the District of Columbia's approach making provision for such adjustment
and apportionment of loss, see note 37 supra. It must be remarked, however, that
under this statute the employee's ultimate recovery where the employer presses a
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after all, the primary concern of the system, has been compensated for
his injuries through the workmen's compensation laws. Work injury liti-
gation directly involving the injured employee has no place in today's
method of providing relief and compensation for work-connected injuries.
claim against a third person may depend upon the chance operation of idiosyncratic
factors entirely unrelated to the severity of the injury or the loss of earning capacity-
the considerations which govern the extent of compensation of other employees under
the workmen's compensation acts. In other words, the current statutory scheme
itself provides unequal recoveries for equal injuries-compensation which is inadequate
in most cases but more than adequate in a few cases where damages may be recovered
from a third party.
